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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I add to existing scholarship an explanation of the rhetorical priming work that 
Franklin D. Roosevelt employed to overcome isolationism in the United States. Roosevelt asked 
the American people to trust him through the next great world crisis and used his prior two terms 
as well as strategic enemy construction as support. He framed the memory of his first two terms 
tightly and told them what to remember from their shared experiences to formulate an America 
ready for war. His leadership through the Banking Crisis and initiation of many domestic 
policies to keep America great were the basis upon which Roosevelt would prime the American 
people to venture through yet another trying crisis with him. The generation who would fight in 
the noble and good war against the evil Nazi regime was still reeling from the Great Depression 
and the sting of involvement from the First World War. They would need to be rhetorically 
primed to be moved out of their isolationist slumber. 
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The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the 
Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with 
ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation 
can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender. 
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, On the Arsenal of Democracy 
 
Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests 
are in grave danger. With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination 
of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph, so help us God. 
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War 
 
The long known and the long expected has thus taken place. The forces endeavoring to enslave 
the entire world now are moving toward this hemisphere. Never before has there been a greater 
challenge to life, liberty, and civilization. Delay invites greater danger. 
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Requesting War Declarations with Germany and 
Italy 
 
Introduction 
 The decision to go to war is a process that requires the lessons of the past to inform what 
a nation is capable of and what it is willing to do. World War II is remembered as “The Good 
War” and a pillar of morality in America’s past. A nation remembers and makes decisions based 
upon their foundation and shared memories as a way to ensure they are maintaining their core 
values (Bostdorff and Goldzwig, 2005, p. 661). The generation who fought in it is remembered 
fondly for their courageous involvement and sacrifices abroad as well as on the home front. 
Their mission was to protect people all around the world from the oppression of tyrannical 
dictators. In addition to the bloody battles, the Holocaust is known as one of the worst atrocities 
of the twentieth century and of mankind’s history overall (Hasian, 2003, p. 155). The perpetrator 
of the Holocaust, Adolf Hitler, is the evil the world now uses to measure all other evildoers. 
Surely someone so evil in Europe was known to that great generation of Americans and they 
were ready to march against him. Yet, what is not always mentioned in the lore about the 
greatest generation is that between World War I and World War II, the United States was 
staunchly isolationist (Johnson, p. 3, 1944). I will add to existing scholarship an explanation of 
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the rhetorical priming work that Franklin D. Roosevelt employed to overcome isolationism in the 
United States. Roosevelt asked the American people to trust him through the next great world 
crisis and used his prior two terms as well as strategic enemy construction as support. He framed 
the memory of his first two terms tightly and told them what to remember from their shared 
experiences to formulate an America ready for war. His leadership through the Banking Crisis 
and initiation of many domestic policies to keep America great were the basis upon which 
Roosevelt would prime the American people to venture through yet another trying crisis with 
him. The generation who would fight in the noble and good war against the evil Nazi regime was 
still reeling from the Great Depression and the sting of involvement from the first world war. 
They would need to be rhetorically primed to be moved out of their isolationist slumber. 
 In the 1930s the United States was not looking to get involved in another European war. 
With the effects of the Great Depression and the Banking Crisis of 1933 still palpable, the same 
year Adolf Hitler rose to power, the American public was not concerned about what was 
happening overseas. National security had not been a concern because geographically the United 
States had an ocean on either side to protect them from the Axis dictators and the dangers of war. 
The European war was a European problem.  
 The United States had taken a neutral stance in 1939 when war broke out in Europe and 
Hitler was taking over large swaths of Europe by force. Franklin D. Roosevelt had begun to 
monitor the rise and progress of Hitler shortly after he was elected for his first term in 1933. He 
pensively watched the situation in Europe unfold, but bided his time and waited for the right time 
to articulate the threat to the isolationist public. Germany and most of Europe had also been 
struggling economically at the time. Hitler was pulling Germany out of its depression and 
simultaneously built an army (Casey, 2001, location 611). Roosevelt became concerned with the 
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rise of Nazi power early in his presidency and wanted to warn the American people about the 
ferocity of the Third Reich. Though it was only after the attacks at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, that America deployed troops in the second world war, Roosevelt had long been planning 
and working to involve the United States in the front against the Nazi regime. Though it is a 
common notion that Pearl Harbor got America in the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt had busily and 
gradually involved America behind the scenes well before war came to American soil.    
 How did Roosevelt move an isolationist nation into the war before the Pearl Harbor 
attacks? Slowly and carefully. Publicly he used rhetoric and the radio. Privately he knew that war 
was coming and wrote that American efforts against the Nazis had been “futile” in comparison to 
Great Britain in a letter to King George in November of 1940 (“archives.gov,” 1940, para. 5). 
My master’s thesis examines the rhetoric Roosevelt deployed to prime the American people for 
war. Roosevelt’s particular combination of appeals to enemy construction, metaphors, and 
memory in his December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat 16: On the Arsenal of Democracy were 
essential in such priming. I selected this particular speech out of the prewar period because it was 
the first instance of explicit naming of the Germans as the enemy to the American public. This 
was also his first speech about war. According to Steven Casey (2001) “Throughout the summer 
and fall he still habitually refused to name the offending aggressors. Of course, it was never 
difficult to recognize the aggressive dictatorial threat that Roosevelt constantly referred to. But 
before December 29, 1940, he only employed the term Nazi on five occasions, and two of these 
were in a speech on October 26, 1939, that dealt with the New Deal’s internal opponents” (p. 
37). The December 29, 1940, Fireside Chat was given at a key moment, after the fall of France, 
and Roosevelt had waited for the opportunity to give the enemy a face and a name that the 
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American people could rally against. Roosevelt finally felt that public sentiment was malleable 
enough to label the threat against the United States and prime them for war. 
 I propose that On the Arsenal of Democracy is not just a Fireside Chat but presidential 
justificatory war rhetoric as well. The sixteenth Fireside Chat was Roosevelt’s first speech 
directly about the war and about what the United States must do to ensure the Nazis would not 
become victorious. I also argue that enemy construction and memory in tandem were the main 
rhetorical tools that Roosevelt used to prime the nation for and eventually declare war against 
Japan, Germany, and Italy. To examine how the rhetorical priming and enemy construction 
Roosevelt began in On the Arsenal of Democracy succeeded, I include in my study citizen letters 
written in response to the On the Arsenal of Democracy address and Roosevelt’s speeches of 
formal war declaration against Japan on December 8, 1941, and against Germany and Italy on 
December 11, 1941. These texts best exemplify Roosevelt’s World War II enemy construction 
and reflect the priming he did in his On the Arsenal of Democracy Fireside Chat. It was not until 
the Pearl Harbor attacks and the official war declaration that he was specific about the Japanese 
enemy when speaking to the American public. Yet I argue that the declaration of war following 
Pearl Harbor and especially the declarations of war against Germany and Italy were so brief 
because the justificatory work to go to war had already been done one-year prior in On the 
Arsenal of Democracy.  
 My thesis will thus investigate the connections between enemy construction and public 
memory as rhetorical resources in presidential justificatory rhetoric. Demonstrating that the 
rhetorical priming Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced in December of 1940 does a bulk of the 
persuasive work to ensure the success of his later war declarations. His priming the year before 
the war came to American soil framed events in ways that demanded less explanation and 
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justification for war. The official war declarations will support the claims I make about the 
potency of the rhetorical priming that Franklin D. Roosevelt accomplishes in his On the Arsenal 
of Democracy Fireside Chat. Questions driving this study are the following: How did Roosevelt 
portray the enemy for the American people? How did he draw upon the past to justify his 
assertions about the enemy? I will now supply the context of the On the Arsenal of Democracy 
Fireside Chat in order to demonstrate why the rhetorical maneuvering was necessary for priming 
the American people for what was to come. 
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Methodology and Order of Chapters 
 My thesis will consist of two background and literature review chapters, an analytical 
chapter, an effects chapter to demonstrate the reach of Roosevelt’s priming, and a concluding 
chapter of implications of the concept of rhetorical priming that I propose Franklin D. Roosevelt 
delivered in his On the Arsenal of Democracy Fireside Chat. The first chapter contains both 
historical and political context that constrained Roosevelt’s On the Arsenal of Democracy 
Fireside Chat. Chapter 2 contains relevant literature and explains the concepts used to parse 
through the addresses selected from Roosevelt’s pre-war and initiation of war speeches. I 
approach the three addresses in my study to the public with close-textual analysis. Chapter 3, the 
analytical study, will be a focused analysis of Fireside Chat 16: On the Arsenal of Democracy. 
The following, chapter 4, I conduct a reception study to see what the public response was to 
Roosevelt’s proposal to move America out of isolationism. This chapter works to demonstrate 
the impact of the rhetorical priming I argue is at work in the Fireside Chat. Chapter 5, a 
subchapter of effects, is an analysis of the official war declarations against Japan, Germany, and 
Italy to support my claim that these official declarations were brief because of the work done in 
the On the Arsenal of Democracy address. The nation was primed to go to war the year prior 
with memories of Roosevelt’s prior two terms to build their trust in his leadership and vision for 
the American people. 
 In Chapter 2 I provide historical context for the address. Next I preview and define 
rhetorical terms specific to my claims about this Fireside Chat that are different from the official 
war declarations. Since this speech is the most pivotal prewar point in Roosevelt’s enemy 
construction, I incorporate the guidance of Martin J. Medhurst’s (1997) “strategic” criticism for 
rhetoric that precedes the declaration and literal involvement of the nation in war (p. 20). 
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Strategic criticism takes into account the circumstances surrounding the symbolic action taken by 
the rhetor to further explain his or her choices by way of a thorough exploration of the rhetorical 
situation (pp. 20-21).  This lens is necessary given historical accounts of Roosevelt’s pensive and 
conscientious approach to persuade the American people to become involved in the Second 
World War. Since the country was not yet involved in foreign matters, Roosevelt had to prime 
the country psychologically for impending war. It is important that I establish the literal actions, 
political, and economic context of America in 1940 to understand Roosevelt’s decision to 
address the public and situate the Fireside Chat firmly within the category of war discourse and 
presidential justificatory rhetoric.  
 This route has also been encouraged by Amos Kiewe in his book FDR’s First Fireside 
Chat: Public Confidence and the Banking Crisis (2007). Kiewe emphasized the strategy and 
timing that Roosevelt exercised as crucial but in order for the critic to fully analyze it, he or she 
must take into account the context of the speech (p. 21). Not only did Roosevelt face the 
challenges of moving an isolationist country into action, he had to illustrate the unseen enemy 
verbally to the Americans who mistook two oceans as sufficient protection from enemy forces. 
This approach is also suggested due to Roosevelt’s direct and simple, yet unconventional, 
approach to speaking directly to the American people. 
 In this Fireside Chat Roosevelt did what the American people would expect the President 
to do in the official declaration of war. Roosevelt had already accomplished the justification 
work in this Fireside Chat so he had little work to do in the declaration against Japan and almost 
no work was necessary to declare war against Germany and Italy. Casey (2001) offers 
perspective behind this decision to emphasize the Germans before the war officially began for 
the United States: “Roosevelt therefore viewed both Germany and Japan through a similar 
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framework of fears and hopes, but with one vital difference: in his opinion, the Japanese threat 
clearly paled next to the danger posed by Hitler and the Nazis, who aimed at world, rather than 
regional, domination. Unlike the Japanese, the Nazis also had a military machine impressive 
enough to directly menace the Western Hemisphere, especially if Britain or the USSR were to 
collapse” (location 685-691). The Germans were the literal threat in Europe at the time On the 
Arsenal of Democracy was delivered and the Japanese were not considered a threat until they 
attacked Pearl Harbor the following year.   
 Along with analysis of the speech I analyze public reception of the sixteenth Fireside 
Chat by collecting popular opinion of the speech. I will do this by finding tropological 
consistencies in citizen letters, correspondence from reporters, and other documents available in 
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Archives. I will look for consistencies and then code them to 
offer a glimpse into how the shift in national identity that Roosevelt proposed in the Arsenal 
address was received and to demonstrate the effectiveness of Roosevelt’s priming. The 
President's Personal File #200, "Public Reaction Letters," in the archives will be the resource for 
this chapter. This will help illustrate the American psyche after the speech and before the Pearl 
Harbor attacks. After the attacks were carried out and the Axis threat Roosevelt warned of 
materialized, there was clearly support for sending more than armaments to fight. I will follow 
the methodology of Gerard Hauser’s chapter from Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics 
and Public Spheres (1999) to sort through the correspondence and analyze trends in the public 
reactions to the address. Hauser (1999) suggests that studying the correspondence from citizens 
during Roosevelt’s presidency offers access to, “a discursively constituted world shared by the 
people and a leader who is designated to decide” (p. 235). Since Roosevelt redefined national 
identity in the process of priming the public for war, access to the sentiments after the speech 
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was given offer insight into whether or not the proposed identity resonated with the American 
people and how prepared they would be for when war reached American soil. 
 Finally I perform a close-textual and strategic analysis of the official war declarations. I 
offer a brief synopsis of the historical conditions in which the speeches were delivered and then 
demonstrate where enemy construction and memory are deployed by Roosevelt to justify war 
against these three countries. The bulk of this work will be done on the declaration against Japan 
because it is the longer of the two addresses. I attend to trends and similar language clusters from 
On the Arsenal of Democracy to see how he crafted his argument for war. How Roosevelt 
referenced his prior statements in his Fireside Chat offers insight into the potency of that 
particular address and how it enabled him to make succinct arguments about the nature of the 
Axis enemy in the Pacific and Europe. I also attend to uses of enemy construction as well as 
memory to expose the commonalities of all three addresses, since they are, as I argue, all 
justificatory war rhetoric.  
The declaration against Japan needed to be longer because Roosevelt’s focus in 1940, and 
still in 1941, was on Germany and the Nazi threat to democracy in America. The implications of 
rhetorical priming are helpful to scholarly discourses surrounding national identity, memory, 
enemy construction, and justificatory rhetoric because it offers a way of cognitively grasping the 
work that Roosevelt’s addresses to the public did. Rhetorical priming is a synesthetic rhetoric 
that makes the public see what is heard and thereby make the listener more involved in the vision 
put forward. For historians or political scientists looking at Roosevelt’s presidency, rhetorical 
priming is another way to explore the immense amount of changes that took place while he was 
in office as well as contribute to understanding his popularity. Roosevelt’s policy decisions as 
well as his inner fears about the Axis powers were expressed in his rhetoric to the public.  
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Chapter 1--Historical and Political Context 
The Years Between World War I and World War II 
 The years leading up to United States involvement in the Second World War were 
complicated. Roosevelt faced steep challenges. Privately he watched the situation in Europe 
unfold as Hitler rose to power and took the reigns of Germany. Publicly he knew that the 
American people wanted to avoid war at all costs and 1940 was an election year. The 
isolationists in political positions worked hard to keep Roosevelt out of office because of his 
eagerness to extend aid to Great Britain and France. They feared that this would make the United 
States look involved and less than neutral with regard to European affairs a tactic that proved 
costly during World War I. Politicians and citizens alike were uneasy about the escalating 
aggression abroad. According to Walter Johnson, “The fear of a new war came at a time when 
the country was extremely skeptical of the wisdom of having entered the last conflict. In 1934 a 
great many books and articles were written describing the intrigues and profits of munitions-
manufacturers. In the spring of that year the Senate set up a committee with Gerald Nye as its 
chairman to investigate the activities of the American munitions industry. The committee 
showed that excessive profits had been made during the First World War by bankers and 
armament-makers” (1944, p. 14). The war abroad was viewed by some as an opportunity to 
become engaged for reasons less noble than saving democracy. The interests were feared to be 
economic at the cost of young American lives.  
 Politically the times were fraught with tensions for Roosevelt as the Republican Party 
sought to regain control. Running for a third term, let alone pondering getting the United States 
involved in European affairs, were both contentious issues that the Republicans were not hesitant 
to hold as evidence they should regain office. The Republicans viewed Roosevelt’s efforts to 
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change neutrality laws as flippantly disrespectful to the many in the nation who were isolationist 
and identified it as evidence that Roosevelt acted like a dictator rather than a president (Johnson, 
1944, p. 52). Many thought that Roosevelt would respect Washington’s decision to retire due to 
age and health reasons and not exceed the two-term tradition set before his presidency. 
According to Gerard Hauser (1999):  
The possibility of Franklin D. Roosevelt's candidacy had been a subject of highly partisan 
speculation almost since his reelection in 1936. By 1940 the outbreak of war in Europe 
strengthened these partisan views. For those opposed to a third term, recollections of 
World War I evoked intensified expressions of isolationism and fears that FDR was 
leading the nation into war. For those in favor of his candidacy, the world crisis mandated 
experience in the White House to preserve the country's neutrality while preparing its 
defenses against the Nazi threat. The electorate also was deeply concerned and divided 
about the direction of the economy if Roosevelt were or were not to continue in office”  
(pp. 235-236).  
Concerns over the economy, the war abroad, and the memories of World War I were issues 
circulating while Roosevelt campaigned against Wendell Willkie. “When the Democratic 
convention adopted a plank calling for material aid to the victims of ‘ruthless aggression,’ both 
parties were on record as favoring all legal aid to the Allies. However, throughout the campaign 
the editor of the Emporia Gazette was for Wendell Willkie. Since both candidates stood for aid 
to the Allies, his opposition to Roosevelt centered around the third term. He felt that a third term 
was dangerous because it was not wise to keep one party in control for twelve years. The party 
out of power for twelve years might disintegrate, and the country would have a one-party system. 
White also thought that Wendell Willkie, because of his executive training, was better equipped 
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to the job of arming American and that he had more political courage than Roosevelt” (Johnson, 
1944, p. 126). The Republican Party had been out of power for twelve years and was certain that 
it was their turn to lead.  
World War II is now remembered as a just and uniting war supported by all Americans. 
Yet, jumping into the fray was not something that the American people wanted. The war abroad 
was a deeply dividing issue amongst the Democrats and the Republicans. David Kennedy (1999) 
said, “Despite the president’s measured caution, the announcement of a special congressional 
session instantly galvanized the champions of isolation. Senator Borah broadcast a lurid warning 
on September 14, 1939 that tampering with the neutrality law would surely lead to eventual 
American belligerency (a prediction that was to prove correct)” (p. 433). Many Republicans 
seized the opportunity to rally isolationist sentiments behind defeating Roosevelt’s reelection 
efforts. Roosevelt worked slowly and cautiously to send more aid to Great Britain because 
Churchill had regularly requested assistance for the past year. Casey (2001) states that Franklin 
D. Roosevelt was keenly aware of the overwhelming isolationist sentiment leading up to the war: 
“Indeed, what frequently struck Roosevelt was not the high levels of support for the war, but the 
constant mutterings of discontent, the lack of awareness of the true nature of the enemy, and the 
sometimes half-hearted support for his administration’s policies” (p. xviii). Roosevelt, with the 
1940 presidential election behind him, could work in December of that year to reveal his policy 
efforts to keep the United States safe to the American people. Marouf Hasian (2003) states, “As 
we assess the rhetorical histories that appear on our hermeneutic horizons, we need to keep in 
mind the many material and symbolic constraints of the times-what looks feasible today may not 
have looked that way in the 1940s” (p. 167). Roosevelt had to carefully construct his argument 
for military involvement as well as an increased naval presence in both the Atlantic and Pacific 
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oceans. He also needed to compel the American people that the industrial readiness of the United 
States would be economically beneficial and a neighborly necessity, in line with the Monroe 
Doctrine, to Allied nations overseas in order to keep the American people safe from Nazi world 
domination. 
 Despite the ardent isolationist sentiment, Roosevelt worked to prime the American people 
for intervention in Europe. He worked behind the scenes; built up armaments, sent what little 
arms the United States had to Great Britain, and enacted a meager draft. Casey (2001) comments 
that the fall of France assisted in shifting public sentiment though there was still a debate about 
how involved America should be overseas. “In the shock that followed the fall of France, 
Congress appropriated all the funds, and more, that the president and his military advisers asked 
for, allocating $3 billion to the armed forces in June, when in April legislators had been reluctant 
to even approve military expenditures of $853 million. Support from the general public for 
compulsory military service also shot up. The support for growing the United States military 
through compulsory commitment rose from 39 percent in October 1939 to 50 percent June 1940. 
And if worst came to worst, and Germany did emerge triumphant in Europe, 88 percent of 
Americans wanted the United States to ‘arm to the teeth,’ while only 8 percent thought the 
United States could get along peacefully with the Third Reich” (pp. 25-26). Roosevelt was aware 
that the public stance had shifted in 1940, and federal representatives of the public were more 
willing to allocate wartime funds, as events abroad turned more bloody and dire.  
 The American people were caught in a debate as European countries and the Nazis 
engulfed even North African countries. The nation was caught between people who wanted to 
remain neutral and isolationist and people who wanted to ensure the war would stay away from 
the United States. Kennedy remarked, “Public opinion and official policy alike hung quivering 
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between hope and fear—hope that with American help the Allies could defeat Hitler, and fear 
that events might yet suck the United States into the conflict” (1999, p. 434). Some people read 
the fall of France as a warning to stay neutral and others viewed it as a good time to become 
involved. Casey articulates the shift here: “As this ‘great debate’ unfolded, Roosevelt soon 
recognized that the sheer force of events was encouraging most Americans to adopt a moderate 
interventionist stance” (location 1009). Fueled by winning the 1940 election, Roosevelt’s 
confidence and the changed tides in the American public concerning involvement in Europe 
meant securing aid to Britain. Roosevelt’s decision to aid Britain was highly public and he made 
his case for action clear in the On the Arsenal of Democracy speech. Casey (2001) also marked 
the November election as pivotal for Roosevelt’s policy toward the war abroad: “Thereafter, the 
president recognized that most Americans endorsed extending aid to Britain, even if it meant 
risking war” (p. 28). Roosevelt understood that the public had finally come around, he 
understood that and the timing of the sixteenth Fireside Chat was key to priming the public for 
intervention in the war. By the end of 1940, the American people seemed more aware of the 
German threat and polling data showed that they also viewed Japan as a threat secondary to 
Germany (Casey, 2001, p. 29). 
 Roosevelt recognized the power of directly speaking to the public and he ensured his 
messages would be viewed as reflective of public sentiment by combing through citizen letters, 
opinion polls, newspapers, and unofficial channels to assess the pulse of what they were thinking 
before he would speak. This allowed Roosevelt to respond to public fears directly without the 
bias of the media. Casey accounts for the way in which Roosevelt would write his Fireside Chats 
in 1940: “By 1940, the president generally relied on three men to sort through these and fashion 
them into a rough draft: Samuel I. Rosenman, a New York State judge who had worked for 
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Roosevelt since the late 1920s; Robert E. Sherwood, the staunchly pro-interventionist 
playwright; and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s closest confidant who lived and worked in the 
Lincoln Bedroom on the second floor of the White House” (2001, p. 33). Roosevelt’s access to 
multiple channels, official and unofficial, assisted in his ability to craft such compelling 
speeches. He incorporated the fears, hopes, and dreams of the American public in order to 
persuade them that his leadership would maintain their wishes and keep the nation in good order. 
 Roosevelt’s style and manner of speaking was also an asset in his rhetorical priming. The 
American people were already familiar with his voice on the radio and he was selective with his 
wording. This was Roosevelt’s sixteenth Fireside Chat and the American people had been 
listening to these particular types of addresses over the radio since March 4, 1933 (Kiewe, 2007, 
p. 9). He put things simply and expressed a deep commitment to the people. His selection of 
words and cadence made the message readily accessible because the language he used was 
visceral and corporeal. His use of vision metaphors and bodily rhetorics enabled him to strike a 
chord of action and capability with the American people (Houck, 1997, p. 32). Just as Roosevelt 
had a vision in his first term for the American people to defeat the Great Depression and Banking 
Crisis of 1933, he had a vision of how America would keep democracy safe from Nazi clutches.  
 The way Roosevelt used his words to visualize the enemy for the public was particularly 
effective. Enemy construction was a tool the President used to alert the public and get them to 
rally around the war effort. Casey (2001) concurs that the rallying power of enemy construction 
was part of Roosevelt’s plan, “This it does by depicting the enemy as ‘altogether evil’ and 
thereby inciting the masses ‘to paroxysms of hatred.’ In adopting this course, American leaders 
are able to forge a popular consensus behind the war effort” (p. xix). Roosevelt waited until after 
the American people watched the fall of France to Nazi power to name, describe, and indict the 
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German government of their quest for world domination. After this movement of occupation was 
grossly apparent in Europe, Roosevelt made it clear that they were now headed for the North 
American continent. Crafting a new take on the American national identity was the greatest 
maneuver that Roosevelt had to accomplish in the prewar period before the attacks at Pearl 
Harbor. In the following section, I review relevant scholarship that shows how enemy 
construction and memory both have the ability to construct and inform national identity. 
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Chapter 2--Literature Review: Tools for Rhetorical Priming 
Enemy Construction 
 Understanding the functions of rhetorically constructing an enemy is essential to this 
study. Enemy construction facilitates national identity, group cohesion, and justifies force against 
the named enemy. Effective use of enemy construction would also assist Roosevelt to overcome 
some of his obstacles both politically and historically. Unity and cohesion of citizens can be 
secured through the introduction of a common foe. The situation abroad early in World War II 
needed to be explained through the antagonist in order to fully demonstrate the threat to the 
United States and the military action that Roosevelt wanted the American people to take. 
Benjamin R. Bates (2004) offers insight into war justification and how enemy construction lends 
itself well to such efforts: “In war rhetoric, metaphors are often used to reshape public 
perceptions of the enemy so that there is no alternative to war. Rather than seeing metaphors as 
illustrative, they become constitutive of reality” (p. 451). Metaphors enable comprehension of a 
complex situation in simple terms, so comparing the foreign enemy to something the American 
people are familiar with is highly effective in enemy construction. 
 Enemy construction constitutes the enemy but it also reconstitutes the historical situation. 
Enemy construction often shapes realities, creates the need for force, and then demands that 
force be taken up against the enemy constructed. For their analysis of the Cold War, Lynn B. 
Hinds and Theodore O. Windt (1991) argue, “Language itself is a creative act, not an added-on 
interpretation that comes from an act. ... This process of uniting the two, we call a language-
event, a unity of political language and actual events that creates political reality both in 
perception and in expression” (p. 9). The construction of an enemy is not isolated; it sends 
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ripples out into the present and the future. Hinds and Windt cite naming, metaphor, and formal 
definitions as specific elements of language essential to constructing a reality and an enemy for 
the public (p. 11). Enemy construction also supplies a motive and implies a way to deal with the 
Other. This shapes the situation in which the enemy is constructed significantly. Enemy 
constructions should also make the argument that the actions that must be taken against the 
“savage” Other are just and further the promotion of overall peace (Bates, 2004, p. 454). 
Building a foul motive is a pillar to the construction of an enemy. Temporally, the development 
of an enemy makes it easier to look back and remember why force was the only option. 
 Motives of the enemy add to the cogency of the argument to go to war or to halt an 
aggressor. In Ivie’s (1980) article Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War he 
investigates the specific justificatory functions of enemy construction for a democratic country 
entering war. He lists the dichotomies commonly offered while constructing an enemy: “force 
vs. freedom, irrationality vs. rationality, and aggression vs. defense” (p. 281). These dichotomies 
establish the characteristic nature of the enemy and the one naming the enemy simultaneously. 
Notice that Ivie’s findings point to the motives of either party as well. An enemy’s motives can 
never be for good or for pursuits that align with civilization. This makes the civilized party look 
righteous in their quest to obliterate the enemy. 
 The simple use of pronouns in the rhetoric of enemy construction assists the function of 
identity construction. Bhatia (2007) states, “The determiner ‘our’ and pronoun ‘we’ can be seen 
to muster support for future actions, arousing a sense of patriotism, unity, and moral obligation 
with the good American people standing against the evil terrorists” (p. 512). In this example, the 
American identity is strengthened in opposition to the "Evil" terrorists. The “us” versus “them” 
binary, common to enemy construction, works both ways. The “us” is always stronger, more 
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rational, and civilized in comparison to the Other and is in the position to create the distinction as 
well as place the Other into a dichotomous category. According to Bhatia, “...the notion of good 
evokes something absolute and unquestionable.” Evil is personified rather than simply being an, 
“ intensifier or adjective” (2007, p. 516). This is where “evil” is fleshed out as a useful term in 
the discursive strategy of enemy construction. The term “evil” is value laden, not just the 
opposite of “good.” It includes all the facets of moral life and connotes that the Other is depraved 
in every possible way, which enables forgetting the consequences of using force.  
 Enemy construction works from a point of shared values that are projected upon a 
collective of “civilized” people and set up in opposition to the “savagery” they face together. 
This is a point of connection and unification that furthers the construction of the “us” versus 
“them” dichotomy.  This dichotomy works to rally support from multiple and varied audiences 
because, according to Bates (2004), “If a people views itself as civilized (which nearly all do), 
then the savage should be seen as a threatening force in a universal sense” (p. 454). The 
dichotomous language of “us” versus “them” is a prevalent trend in enemy construction. The 
strategy involves developing an Other, different and unintelligible as fully human. John R. Butler 
(2002) argues that the development of a savage other has continuity based in the history of the 
United States as a world power. The construction of an enemy simultaneously defines the other 
as savage and the rhetor as civilized (p. 9). Furthermore, enemy construction also involves the 
following features listed by Roger Bromley, such as “reductionism, simplification and 
essentialism” that the United States consistently uses to describe the enemy (2011, p. 51). This 
assists in forming the enemy as well as the coherence and acceptability of the dangers the enemy 
present to the civilized group.  
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 While Roosevelt needed to approach the war carefully in front of the American people, it 
was also necessary to make it look as though the peaceful nation was being forced into the 
conflict. Roosevelt needed to appear unwillingly tangled up in foreign affairs yet prepared and 
determined to protect the American people from war and a voracious enemy. Roosevelt 
cultivated an American identity as a nation that would defend democracy and keep liberty intact 
around the world. Ivie (1980) furthers this point by explaining that enemy construction is useful 
to expiate guilt and “establish the enemy’s culpability” thus excusing the use of force while 
maintaining a wholesome and democratic identity (p. 280). Ivie cites Kenneth Burke’s 
conception of the victimage ritual as a means of using force without the consequences or blame 
of the violent act. Enemy construction not only reifies the identity of the civilized party but it 
also keeps the party innocent while perpetrating violent acts. The constructed enemy is the 
scapegoat onto which all blame and guilt is placed, then the enemy must be destroyed in order to 
expiate the negativity that accompanied the use of force (p. 280). This is common in the history 
of wars and how Americans have justified past actions. Typically the scapegoat is “out there,” as 
Spurr (1993) puts it, and is in a place where the other is viewed as primitive, in need of 
intervention, and the intervention could not simply be diplomatic since the enemy lacks the 
civilization necessary for such an act to be productive (p. 25). The dangers abroad were what 
Roosevelt called upon to craft the new national identity as a people ready and willing to defend 
democracy against the evil Axis bent on destroying its way of life. 
Memory and Epideictic Rhetoric to Bolster the Creation of the German Enemy 
 Coaxing the nation into war was going to take more than an enemy in a distant land. 
Bolstering the enemy with both strategic evocations of national memory and an epideictic call to 
the American people assisted in priming them rhetorically for war. Roosevelt had to refashion 
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the national identity as a defender of democracy rather than a neutral and isolationist state. 
Though memory has many different labels, for example “public memory,” “collective memory,” 
or “cultural memory,” my focus is to employ memory as a rhetorical resource for the rhetor 
(Casey, 2004; Browne, 1993; Sturken, 1997). Memory can be a useful tool to assist the 
audience’s comprehension and the orator’s credibility for an argument. Stephen Browne (1993) 
refers to successful orators as “custodians of public memory,” who “convince others to 
collaborate in strategic and stylized conceptions of the past,” (p. 465). Roosevelt had a 
foundation on which to select and craft an updated identity to match the new oppressive forces in 
1940. That foundation was the cultural memory of the time: Roosevelt had his prior two terms as 
president to rely on to build his argument. Kendall Phillips (2004) states, “These memories that 
both constitute our sense of collectivity and are constituted by our togetherness are thus deeply 
implicated in our persuasive activities and in the underlying assumptions and experiences upon 
which we build meanings and reasons” (p. 3). Roosevelt would supply meaning and reason by 
crafting a specific version of the past that offered the American people a starting point from 
which to support his stance for sending aid to Great Britain and becoming the arsenal of 
democracy. Memory and epideictic rhetoric, the latter a component of war rhetoric, are 
interwoven in this craftsmanship. Marita Sturken’s definition of “cultural memory” as, “a field of 
contested meanings in which Americans interact with cultural elements to produce concepts of 
the nation, particularly in events of trauma, where both the structures and the fractures of a 
culture are exposed,” is the most helpful to this study (pp. 2-3). Sturken’s definition is most 
suitable to my pursuit because Roosevelt had conscientiously responded to what was on the 
minds of the American people in the On the Arsenal of Democracy address. Roosevelt’s time in 
office and the experiences he shared with the American public were ripe for the picking. By 
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selecting which moments from the past to highlight he could more tightly control how the past 
was used to support his calls for sending aid to Great Britain and simultaneously leave out 
looming concerns of war racketeering, dispel isolationist sentiments as un-American, and leave 
the Republican Party looking out of date. Leaving out his experience as Woodrow Wilson’s 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy was a key part of his tight framing of his ability to lead for pure 
reasons, unaffiliated with the negative memories from World War I. His time and involvement in 
the Wilson Administration is absent. 
 By utilizing recent cultural memory, Roosevelt made a case for intervention and war 
through tactics that revealed the structure, fractures, and potential fractures in American culture 
at the time of his Arsenal address. To shore up the fractures and the potential fractures Roosevelt 
suggested improvements and assigned both praise and blame internally. Epideictic rhetoric 
assigns virtues to a community and is concerned with the present, which is necessary in order to 
cultivate a coherent national identity (Aristotle, 2007, p. 48). Bradford Vivian (2006) adds, 
“Epideictic speech, like political manifestoes, commonly adheres to familiar rhetorical forms. Its 
‘contours’ do not provide mere ornamentation but acquire a semiotic dimension, signifying its 
customary meaning and value in the perpetuation of civic norms and traditions” (p. 7). The 
Fireside Chat was a common and well-known form of public address at the time. The American 
people were well accustomed to it by the sixteenth one. Recalling portions of the national 
identity that would assist Roosevelt’s efforts to involve the United States in war were essential in 
order to make the America people feel heard yet allow Roosevelt to shepherd them toward 
agreement with his policy decisions. 
 Memory serves multiple rhetorical purposes. Memory, as a rhetorical tool, assists the 
orator to build national identity, construct enemies in contrast to the nation, and provide a 
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common ground for the people. Stephen H. Browne (1993) cites rituals of public memory as 
potent and useful for orators. “These performances take on a powerfully rhetorical aspect 
because they help negotiate conditions of community and provide symbols of identity and 
difference” (p. 465). Browne states that memory is a “symbolic construction” in so far as it is a 
“product of public, persuasive memory” (p. 465). By selecting and framing the moments of his 
presidency that would build his ethos best for leading the United States through a world crisis 
were harnessed in order to move the nation toward war. As part of identity crafting, Roosevelt’s 
addresses belong in the genre of epideictic rhetoric as well. Browne finds that memory is a 
common resource for epideictic rhetoric (p. 465). The memory of the people is channeled to the 
purposes of the orator. Browne (1993) cites the benefits of epideictic rhetoric because of the 
memory it readily evokes: “As a genre, it is defined by its capacity to project back onto the 
audience values it believes to possess already” (p. 475). Roosevelt did not have to completely 
break down and remake the national identity; he simply needed to select from the resources of 
memory what he wanted them to remember. Edward Casey (2004) remarks that public memory 
possesses a “bivalent” quality and maneuvers between the past and the future by acting “to 
ensure a future of further remembering of that same event” (p. 17). To evoke the past in public 
address is a way to reintroduce a prior event into present-day public memory.  
 As will be apparent in the analysis, Roosevelt’s ability to regulate what should be 
remembered and how it should be remembered is evident. Vivian (2010) finds both memory and 
forgetting symbolic resources that supply order and meaning to the present (p. 12). Vivian also 
finds that public memory assists in offering a coherence of identity (p. 55). An orator who 
harnesses both components of memory can effectively use them to his or her advantage and 
reorder the past to serve his or her rhetorical purposes. Offering a new order can alter the way the 
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public envisions its nation and its role in the world. Roosevelt in a sense was asking the 
American people to forget the old ways of isolationism and their fears of economic suffering 
because of war. Roosevelt’s reenvisioned America could overcome these fears and embrace the 
responsibilities of supporting the Allied powers as proactive defenders of democratic principle 
and morals at home and abroad. 
 Memory serves the purposes of the orator as much as it does the cogency of a community 
and the enemy being constructed. The past has already been proven and provides a factual 
reference point, whereas the future is unforeseen. The American public would have been familiar 
with the economic woes and the Banking Crisis that Roosevelt asked them to recall. With the 
assistance of these particular memories, Roosvelt’s rhetorical priming was enhanced. Orators 
who evoke memory often incorporate existing American myths and values. According to Denise 
Bostdorff and Steven Goldzwig (2005) there are “two mythic strands-one moralistic and one 
materialistic” (p. 664). These strands combine Constitutional rights with the ideals of democracy 
and with the materialism Americans are accustomed to, both necessary for building an argument 
of national identity and crafting it to the orator’s needs. Sturken (1997) argues that cultural 
memory is important to history because it is “essential to its construction” (p. 4). Cultural 
memory and history, consistent markers of American identity from the nation’s birth, strike a 
symbiotic balance. Cultural memory can be used to invoke history and craft a moment that will 
live in infamy. Roosevelt balanced the nation’s cultural memory, fondly remembered events as 
well as those that made the public withdrawn from foreign affairs, to express the identity that he 
envisioned for it. With the picture of a contrasting enemy image, this feat was more manageable. 
Roosevelt led the nation to one of the most monumental wars in American history. World War II 
shaped the way the nation saw itself and is now remembered as what fully pulled the United 
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States out of the Great Depression. He accomplished all of this even though national identity was 
still bound to isolationist sentiments that dated back to the horrors of World War I. Cultural 
memory both enabled and constrained his arguments in the speeches for this study.  
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Chapter 3: On the Arsenal of Democracy: Priming America for War 
 Though the common perception is that America engaged in World War II after the 
December 7,1941 attacks at Pearl Harbor, American intervention commenced gradually the year 
before the war officially began for the United States. Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s sixteenth 
Fireside Chat titled On the Arsenal of Democracy was delivered to the American public after a 
long line of decisions and actions Roosevelt had carried out behind the scenes. The Fireside Chat 
in December 1940 represents a critical stage, making the intervention public, in this succession 
of literal and symbolic actions. It served as a priming mechanism to explain prior actions and to 
persuade the American people that this was the right path to be on. Becoming involved in world 
affairs was necessary to protect democracy at home and abroad. Recognizing the speech as 
presidential justificatory rhetoric as well as war rhetoric is crucial to identifying this priming 
function. This speech supplied the proof to support these actions and Roosevelt further justified 
the orientation toward war in a public manner.  
 In July of 1940 Roosevelt consulted with Congress and passed the 'Two Ocean Navy 
Expansion Act.' This act allowed the United States Navy more presence in the Pacific and 
Atlantic oceans to curb attacks from either German or Japanese forces (“worldwar2.net,” 2006). 
In October there was a modest draft enacted for Americans who were eighteen to nineteen years 
of age and conscription began for the first time during a period of peace on October 29, 1940. 
Young American men from all over the United States either volunteered or were drafted to start 
training with left over gear from World War I in places all over the Southern states and Alaska 
(“worldwar2.net,” 2006; “WWII in HD,” 2009).  
 The Fireside Chat came after cooperation between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill agreed to the “Destroyers-for-Bases” treaty with England, an allied power already 
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steeped in combat and strife with German forces (Miller Center, 2012). This was a public move 
that Roosevelt made to assist the British forces that stood between America and the German 
threat. Roosevelt was keenly aware of the struggles in Europe and wished to become prepared 
for impending war. Roosevelt foreshadowed the intention to increase industry of munitions in a 
November 22, 1940 letter to King George. In the letter Roosevelt refers to those who did not 
want to see him reelected because of his willingness to assist the British. He described them as 
“Pro-Germans,” “Communists,” and “Total Isolationists” who did not wish to assist Great 
Britain, a country already dealing with mass air raids and German attacks in 1940. Furthermore 
Roosevelt stated, “In regard to materials from here, I am, as you know, doing everything possible 
in the way of acceleration and in the way of additional release of literally everything that we can 
spare” (“archives.gov,” 1940, para. 3). He referred to the American efforts toward the war as 
“futile” in comparison to what the British had endured and sacrificed and ensures King George 
that the “monthly production here is speeding up and will continue to do so” (para. 6). The 
materials and increased speed of production Roosevelt spoke of were the very topic of the 
sixteenth Fireside Chat. Roosevelt understood that he must get the nation to collectively take 
steps to prepare for war. The modest draft enacted earlier that year and the training of U.S. 
soldiers was necessary because the United States military was small and underdeveloped at that 
point. Roosevelt saw what was happening in Europe with the rapid Nazi advances and the brutal 
Japanese expansion into the rest of Asia. Across the pond in either direction was war.  
 On the Arsenal of Democracy is remarkable for a few reasons. It stands on its own, not as a 
formal declaration, but as a priming mechanism for the impending declarations to follow one 
year later. Though Roosevelt’s rhetoric has been thoroughly covered in the discipline, this 
speech has not received much attention. It also has yet to be claimed as war or justificatory 
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rhetoric. Typically American war rhetoric is reserved for when the country is entering a war or is 
already in the thralls of it. On the Arsenal of Democracy was delivered to the American people 
on December 29, 1940. I demonstrate that the sixteenth Fireside Chat is an example of war 
rhetoric by conducting a close textual analysis of the speech. More specifically I substantiate my 
claim by showing how Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat was a priming mechanism for the impending 
war declarations that would follow the December 7, 1941, Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor. 
Roosevelt used war and geographical metaphors to focus on a supportive yet active role in the 
European war that prepared the American people, economy, and American industry for wartime 
duties. This particular instance of war rhetoric justifies the U.S. government’s active preparation 
for military commitments, though at that point Roosevelt had not proposed sending troops, just 
armaments.  
 In 1939 Germany invaded Poland and World War II began in Europe. In little over a year 
Hitler’s regime stretched over many European countries, all had been taken by force. Japan 
joined the Axis power alliance in September of 1940, three months before the Fireside Chat, but 
they were not yet a proven foe to the United States. With German U-boats back in the Atlantic, 
the memory of World War I and the proven German threat nearing the United States could not 
have been more pertinent to constructing the German enemy. Constructing the German enemy 
was surely assisted by the memory of the First World War and the aggression of the German 
army toward the United States in the past. The German threat needed to be more pronounced 
than the Japanese since German forces were doing the most damage in the European theater. The 
Japanese threat was too distant at that point though Roosevelt does allude to their might and 
determination for world domination (“worldwar2.net,” 2006). 
 I argue enemy construction was a critical tool that Franklin D. Roosevelt used to prime the 
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public for war in this radio address. Key to Roosevelt’s rhetoric of enemy construction is when 
he invokes the public’s memory to prime the nation for the war effort. In this chapter, I seek to 
forge the connections between American identity and the building of an enemy to justify war to 
the American people. Memory is a key function to building national identity as well as an enemy 
that the nation had fought in World War I. Along with this theme of memory, the evocation of 
past wars and the banking crisis are catalysts for the epideictic and citizenry expectation 
functions in the speech. Memory, in this case prior wars and the economy prior to World War II, 
both enabled and constrained the justifications Roosevelt used to involve the United States in 
war. The speech provided a rhetorical foundation in 1940 for the rest of the war and how 
involved America would eventually become. By identifying the German army as the enemy and 
true foe to the entire globe, Roosevelt engaged in epideictic rhetoric. Roosevelt had developed 
trust and credibility with the American public by psychologically leading them away from fear 
with the banking crisis. Now he was asking them to trust him again and support his choice of 
militarizing production in the United States to keep them safe, secure, and free from fear. Much 
like his March 4,1933 First Inaugural, Roosevelt wants the American people to remember that 
their nation is great, that they should not fear, and that they should act promptly in the face of a 
challenge. What Roosevelt highlighted as examples from the past to construct the motive for the 
present is key to identifying how he primed the American people. By naming the enemy and its 
attributes, Roosevelt established the foil against which the Allies would be measured. The 
defense of democracy and America’s ties to other nations set up constraints that demanded the 
American people become involved in the war through supportive actions, such as armaments 
sent to Great Britain who was identified as an Ally to the United States. This speech foreshadows 
the commitments that Americans would have to make in order to preserve freedom and liberty 
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on their own soil. This effort would require citizens to sacrifice directly for the war effort abroad 
to prevent the Germans from being able to carry out an assault on American soil. One year later, 
the Japanese did what Roosevelt warned both they and the Germans would do. On the Arsenal of 
Democracy was a long and compelling Fireside speech because Roosevelt needed to 
contextualize the transition from a largely isolationist sentiment to a war mentality. Finally, I 
also focus on the imagery and description of the enemy that Roosevelt constructs in the speech to 
justify the involvement in European affairs. Roosevelt made apparent that these threats to Europe 
were threats to America too. He needed to illustrate the growing threat for the American people 
through vivid and descriptive language. In order to do this Roosevelt depicted an enemy savage 
enough to wake America from its isolationist slumber.  
The Power of Fireside Chats 
 Though Roosevelt gave many radio addresses, only a select few were labeled Fireside 
Chats. That is part of why On the Arsenal of Democracy is such a profound address. The 
“Fireside Chat” label itself is significant. Fireside Chats were well known for their intimate, 
simple, and conversational style for addressing complex issues with the American public. This 
was a signature of Roosevelt’s presidency and his public relations success. The Fireside Chats 
were highly anticipated by the American people and the message was guaranteed to be heard by 
many (Aoki, 2006; Kiewe, 2007). This label marked it as an important address in which 
Roosevelt set the context and gave the justification for what he knew was an impending war. The 
speech also came at a time when Americans were still coming out of the Great Depression and 
the banking crisis of 1933. The nation’s economy was not fully restored at the end of the 1930s. 
The justification for the impending intervention in the European theater required great 
significance in order to mobilize the United States industry to focus on war. World War II is now 
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remembered as what pulled the American economy fully out of the Great Depression but at the 
time worrying about foreign affairs would have been a low priority for the public. The 
importance of this Fireside Chat can be discerned in the fact that it was broadcast in six 
languages to homes in the United States and around the world in order to delcare America’s 
defense plan. 
 The Fireside Chats were conducted through the medium of the radio. People sitting around 
the radio in the comfort of their own homes were informed by a welcome and soothing voice that 
had gotten them through the banking crisis in 1933. According to Kiewe these direct addresses to 
the public functioned to “persuade a majority of the American people to accept his domestic and 
foreign policy agendas, and to support his personal political ambitions” (2007, p. 20). This 
simple, straightforward, and personal approach assisted Roosevelt in psychologically preparing 
the nation for war. 
 The medium of the radio was uniquely advantageous for yielding a large audience for 
Roosevelt’s address (Kiewe, 2007, p. 21). Radios were prevalent technology in the American 
home and the Fireside Chats were already well attended to by the sixteenth presentation. I posit 
that the official war declarations against Japan, Germany, and Italy the following year were so 
brief in nature in comparison to this Fireside Chat because much of the persuasion of danger and 
need for action had already been justified. On the Arsenal of Democracy persuaded the American 
people in the intimate and direct manner of a Fireside Chat.  
Definition of Terms 
 The speech, I argue, fits within the discipline as both war and presidential justificatory 
rhetoric. John M. Murphy (2003) defines war rhetoric as: “a rhetorical hybrid, combining the 
qualities of what Aristotle termed deliberative discourse, arguments to justify the expediency or 
32 
 
practicality of an action, and epideictic rhetoric, appeals that unify the community and amplify 
its virtues” (italics in original, p. 609). The Fireside Chat foreshadowed the actions that America 
and the American people would need to take. The virtues of the American citizen were also 
invoked, which made the act of war seem feasible and securing victory in line with what 
Americans could achieve. The epideictic quality of war rhetoric is essential for the discussion 
here. Epideictic rhetoric, as adapted from classical times, is the combination of informing 
citizens of their identity, world making, and assigning blame and praise simultaneously (Murphy, 
2003, pp. 609-613). These functions serve as a foundation for understanding a newly fashioned 
American identity as not isolationist. Through praise and blame Roosevelt reinforced the 
differences between the democratic nations and the Axis powers even further. It was right and 
just to be on the side of democracy as well as to take necessary steps to protect democracy from 
evil foes. 
 The president often performs justificatory rhetoric because he is bestowed with the 
authority to engage the country in the act of war. Richard A. Cherwitz and Kenneth S. Zagacki 
(1986) contend that: “justificatory rhetoric-where presidential discourse was from the very 
beginning part of a larger, overt military retaliation taken by the government of the U.S.” (p. 
308). On the Arsenal of Democracy was clearly priming the nation for war, only after the 
Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor could Roosevelt explicitly make this about retaliation 
specifically for American citizens but there are allusions to the threat that the war in Europe and 
Asia would surely come to America’s shores. 
 Enemy construction is integral to war rhetoric because it assists the justification for action 
and the use of force. James Jasinski (2001) describes discourse that constructs an enemy as 
functional and action oriented. Constructing an enemy creates “communal identity and 
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solidarity” as well works to establish “public anxiety” which lends itself well to the public acting 
in compliance with the government to keep themselves safe (p. 202). This was essential for the 
winter of 1940, because America was in an isolationist mentality and still economically 
recovering from the Great Depression of the 1930s. Jolting Americans into the mindset of 
needing to meddle in foreign affairs would require a threat to their well-being. Roosevelt’s 
sixteenth Fireside Chat took up the mantle of constructing the threats plaguing Europe and Asia 
as shared by the United States in the speech. Identification is a key component to enemy 
construction. In A Rhetoric of Motives (1950), Burke states, “Put identification and division 
ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the other 
begins,” he writes, “and you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric” (p. 25). This affirms 
the epideictic and deliberative nature of the speech by developing a foe worthy of taking action 
against and building the new identity of the American people. Roosevelt’s speech fulfills the 
functions of war rhetoric. According to Murphy’s aforementioned definition, I argue that On the 
Arsenal of Democracy is a “rhetorical hybrid” of deliberative and epideictic rhetoric (2003, p. 
609). Roosevelt’s enemy construction brings to life an unseen fascist enemy while constituting a 
presently isolationist nation as one prepared and able to defeat the Nazi threat.  
 Next I explore Roosevelt’s rhetorical prowess further by illuminating his ability to bring 
the U.S. out of isolationism and into action directly against the newly established enemy. He did 
this with a vision metaphor. First there was the vision of the past, where Americans overcame the 
adversity of the banking crisis in 1933. In the beginning of the speech Roosevelt’s explains, “We 
met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism. We face this new crisis -- this new threat to the 
security of our nation -- with the same courage and realism” (para. 6-7). Second, there was the 
dystopic vision of the future that will surely happen if America does not act immediately to stifle 
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aggressors across the oceans in either direction. Lastly, the vision of the present America where 
Roosevelt dismisses isolationist sentiment where it exists and the swift ability and values of the 
American people that would enable them to carry out his prescribed action. In this aspect, the 
speech is inherently epideictic. Roosevelt was able to constitute the enemy with such immense 
immediacy because he was also able to define who Americans were, what they were capable of, 
and who opposed such fine attributes.  
Enemy Construction: A not so distant foe and the new crisis 
 Roosevelt established a new crisis by illuminating a threat to the American people. This 
was a unique challenge for a few reasons: the nation held an isolationist sentiment and the war 
was in Europe. First Roosevelt had to name a crisis worthy of American action. He did this 
almost immediately: “This is not a Fireside Chat about war. It is a talk on national security” 
(para. 1). He framed the speech and the crisis that he introduced strategically. Roosevelt 
immediately focuses on national security to assuage isolationist sentiments and to avoid giving 
the impression of hastily entering a war. Next he started to develop his portrait of the enemy:  
 For, on September 27th, 1940, this year, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three 
 powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threat 
 that if the United States of America interfered with or blocked the expansion program of 
 these three nations [Germany, Italy, Japan]--a program aimed at world control--they 
 would unite in ultimate action against the United States. (para. 9) 
Part of why this Fireside Chat had to be handled delicately was the isolationist mode that the 
country was in. There were also many political hurdles and partisan divides over how foreign 
relations ought to be approached with the horrors of World War I in recent memory. But as 
Roosevelt pointed to in the passage, the enemy was already hostile and poised to attack.  
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 Though we remember Roosevelt as a champion to the American people, this was not 
necessarily an easy argument to make. Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell (2001) conducted 
a quantitative study that correlated FDR’s Fireside Chats with his high approval ratings of 65 
percent during his first three terms and long lasting admiration from the nation that ranks him as 
one of the “top five presidents” in our nation’s history (p. 198). Here, after combing the FDR 
history, Baum and Kernell assert that, “According to these historical assessments, the nation 
desperately needed leadership and found it in FDR” (p. 199). As early as 1939, they state that 
Roosevelt, despite a “backdrop of partisan strife and an eroding [democratic] base, gingerly 
began cultivating the public’s support for aid to Britain in its war against Germany” and began 
developing the rhetoric he used extensively in the Arsenal of Democracy Fireside Chat (p. 201). 
Roosevelt had, by January 1939, privately decided that war was inevitable and after the State of 
the Union address of that year began focusing his rhetoric toward the ends of preparing America 
for war (p. 211). Through mere mention during direct addresses to the public, a president holds 
the power to direct public attention to specific issues and rally support for war on foreign soil (p. 
212). The Fireside Chat circumvented the usual route of war preparations and Roosevelt went 
directly to the public with his priming techniques to gain support and assistance in Britain’s fight 
against the Germans. Baum and Kernell contend that Roosevelt’s peacetime addresses were 
directly correlated with rise in his approval ratings, which shows that the majority of Americans 
were listening to them (p. 215). He had the ear of the public, now he needed to cultivate a crisis 
and a menacing foe. He introduced the enemy more explicitly:  
 The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to 
 dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of 
 Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world. (para. 
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 10) 
Bringing the Nazi threat into view and making their malicious goals clear, during a peace time 
address, made the new crisis apparent and the need for immediate action explicit. He framed the 
Nazi threat as tyrannical, which means one cannot reason with them, and by proxy made the 
American people rational and good: not wanting the world to be enslaved, but to be the defender 
of freedom. The enemy was clearly the aggressor and action must be taken to stop them from 
toppling the free world. Robert Ivie’s (1980) “Images of Savagery in American Justifications for 
War” investigates the specific justificatory functions of enemy construction for a democratic 
country entering war. He lists the dichotomies commonly offered while constructing an enemy: 
“force vs. freedom, irrationality vs. rationality, and aggression vs. defense” (p. 281). These 
dichotomies establish the characteristic nature of the enemy and the one naming the enemy 
simultaneously. Notice that Ivie’s findings point to the motives of either party as well. An 
enemy’s motives can never be for good or for pursuits that align with civilization. 
 The construction of an enemy invites a unified “we.” George Cheney (1983) extended 
Burke’s notion of consubstantiality and the dual nature of identification: “we never find a ‘pure’ 
form at either extreme because in identification there is implied congregation and segregation; 
identification always suggests a ‘we’ and a ‘they’” (p. 148). Building consubstantiality is 
essential to identification. Roosevelt detailed the crisis and constructed an enemy while 
simultaneously constituting the American people as capable of overcoming it. In order for it to 
be successful and convincing, the “we” has to be deployed in a way that creates a sense of 
consubstantiality, which is the sense of shared substance-be it values, friends, or foes. Roosevelt 
made it clear who the Americans are and the shared values that would help them through this 
approaching crisis. Roosevelt simultaneously induces an Other and defines the “we” that he calls 
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into being, at the same time naming an enemy. In epideictic terms, he praises the Americans and 
blames the enemy for forcing them into the war effort. 
 Consubstantiality is called upon when Roosevelt explicitly connects the new crisis that the 
United States is facing with the banking crisis of 1933. Just like the banking crisis, Roosevelt 
needed to identify the culprits in order to reinforce the persuasive appeal. Americans experienced 
severe economic strife and overcame it collectively through the actions prescribed and the 
psychology of fear being lifted rhetorically by Roosevelt (Kiewe, 2007, p. 66). Roosevelt made a 
similar move at the beginning of the Arsenal address: “I tried to convey to the great mass of 
American people what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives. Tonight, I want to do 
the same thing, with the same people, in this new crisis which faces America” (para. 4-5). 
Roosevelt was connecting the courage and realism that the American people displayed in 1933 to 
the present crisis. He was calling on them to recognize the reality at hand and is trusting them to 
understand the weight of the present crisis and its ultimate meaning. He also had specific action 
in mind to save them again. He made it apparent that the present danger is currently held at bay: 
“At this moment, the forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom 
are being held away from our shores” (para. 14). The word “moment” connotes that it would not 
be long before the threat would be on American shores. The moment would pass soon so action 
must be immediate.  
 Metaphors give a rhetorical foundation for coming to know an enemy. This strategy is 
effective because metaphors cultivate qualities through cognitive shortcuts and constrain possible 
programs of actions toward the enemy. According to Ivie (1997), “metaphor is at the base of 
rhetorical invention. Elaborating a primary image into a well-formed argument produces a 
motive, or interpretation of reality, with which the intended audience is invited to identify” (p. 
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104-105). The metaphor served an illustrative function and provides verisimilitude to the rhetor’s 
case. Ivie explains that metaphors, especially the metaphor of evil, can stifle dissent and 
constrain possible actions against the enemy. "The face of evil colonizes judgment, neutralizes 
arguments for pragmatic alternatives, and diminishes deference to ethical constraints" (2007, p. 
226). The creation of an other, described through the vehicle of evil or savage, can become 
naturalized to the point that politicians, as well as citizens, lose their critical faculties and are no 
longer able to identify it as a construct. In Burke’s notion of naming and the implied program of 
action, enemy construction justifies a certain course of action as well as the use of force in order 
to alleviate of guilt.  
 Another way Roosevelt illuminated the new crisis was through deploying visual 
metaphors. By shrinking the seas and describing the technologies of war, which further justifies 
the need for armaments and aid to those keeping the Nazis at bay, Roosevelt developed a 
cognitive shortcut for the listeners to see the world in a new way. He visualized the globe for 
listeners, “At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less from Washington than it is 
from Washington to Denver, Colorado--five hours for the latest type of bomber. And at the 
North end of the Pacific Ocean America and Asia almost touch each other “(para. 23). 
Roosevelt’s geographic metaphors effectively shrink the distance between the United States and 
the European war such that danger is all the more imminent. He also suggested that the Nazi 
advance, if they overcame the British, could easily establish assault bases in South America or 
Africa. The bomber, new military technology for the war, could bring the Nazi and Japanese 
menace to American soil quickly. Roosevelt states plainly: “And remember that the range of a 
modern bomber is ever being increased,” which makes it known that even if the enemy is not 
capable now, they will be soon (para. 24). Spatial and temporal metaphors are used effectively to 
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define the situation as critical. 
  John Murphy points to the strong isolationist mood that America was in and that 
Roosevelt rhetorically coaxed them out of (p. 129). To undo isolationist reforms as well as win 
over the hearts and minds of the American people, FDR had to, according to Murphy, “make the 
Axis threat present and real” to justify “all aid short of war” (p. 136). Roosevelt did this with 
visual language, shrinking America’s protection from the Pacific and Atlantic oceans by 
describing the capability of bomber technology in addition to the analogy of the banking crisis 
(p. 137). These metaphors created a new perspective for the American people and, as I argue, 
primed them for actions to support Great Britain and eventually enter the war themselves. The 
work of justifying force had begun in his Arsenal of Democracy Fireside Chat before the 
American people even realized the magnitude of the Axis powers in Asia and Europe. Offering 
direct support through munitions and other provisions to keep the British military strong meant 
that Americans were complicit in the violence of the war.  
 This indirect force from American factories empowered the force of the British military 
that was the last stand against the Germans at that point. Murphy cites the “well of trust” that 
Roosevelt had developed earlier during the banking crisis (p. 141). The president had gotten the 
American people through hard times before and now, with this particular Fireside Chat, he brings 
this new crisis to life rhetorically and prescribes the quick action to support Great Britain. Like 
the development of the banking crisis as a psychological malady of fear, the same simplicity is 
present. Roosevelt puts the foreign war in terms that Americans are familiar with, like putting the 
distance from Washington to Denver, Colorado, in terms of bomber capabilities without the need 
to refuel. This spatial and technical metaphor assists the audience to see the enemy in familiar 
and even more menacing terms. The necessity of force and involvement comes out strongly 
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when Roosevelt explained:  
 The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can 
 appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no 
 appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We 
 know that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender. 
 (para. 38) 
Packed into this statement are additional metaphors. The enemy is put into terms the audience 
will know and relate the characteristics of to the new face of the threat. The enemy is reduced to 
a wild animal. The Nazi is a powerful tiger, one would not attempt to reason with a tiger or 
stroke it into domesticity. Next, the enemy is reduced to a weapon of destruction. The enemy, 
whether a wild animal or a bomb, cannot be dealt with any other way than force and both are 
threatening and destructive. While building such a threatening foe Roosevelt knows he cannot 
paralyze the American people by overwhelming them with the might of the enemy. History can 
offer the support that the American people are capable and will win the fight. 
History as analogy 
 While depicting the enemy in terms that the Americans were familiar with, Roosevelt must 
also present the enemy as something the America people could face successfully. As Barbara 
Biesecker (2002) posits, it is the past that serves as the current exigency’s civic lesson. The past, 
in this instance invoked by the President, informs citizens how they ought to behave as citizens 
for this particular exigency (p. 394). Invoking the Banking Crisis, Roosevelt reminded 
Americans: “We met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism. We face this new crisis--this 
new threat to the security of our nation -- with the same courage and realism” (para. 6-7). The 
past supplies the resources for the American people to approach the dangers abroad with 
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confidence because their president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, has led them through overwhelming 
predicaments before and it was his leadership that saw them through it. His proposed action is to 
supply Great Britain with armaments so they can assist the war effort over seas without placing 
troops in Europe yet. Roosevelt describes that possibility and constituted Americans as able 
friends, “I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the nation to build now with all possible 
speed every machine, every arsenal, every factory that we need to manufacture our defense 
material. We have the men--the skill--the wealth-- and above all, the will” (para. 71). If 
Roosevelt’s leadership got them out of the Depression, and through the banking crisis, and is 
solid enough to transition manufacturing to military efforts, then he could keep them safe in the 
face of an aggressor.  
 Roosevelt’s citing of recent history and comparison of past enemies to current ones helps 
to justify preparations for war. History has hermeneutic qualities and allows people to 
understand current events. In his article Operation Enduring Analogy, Noon (2004) explains 
how "Historical analogies offer cognitive frameworks through which we might evaluate new 
information and experience” (p. 340). Roosevelt roots this new crisis in the nation’s history of 
enemies they have overcome: “Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our 
American civilization been in such danger as now” (para. 8). This known historical chapter and 
its allusions to the current situation triggers emotional support for the political decision because 
it is similar to the actions the nation has taken in the past. Noon explains why such analogies are 
persuasive: “When issued by political leaders, historical analogies more often than not serve 
prescriptive rather than descriptive or analytical functions" (p. 340). Roosevelt’s great ability to 
lead the nation and gain enough trust for the American public to agree with his prescribed action 
is something that many scholars have noted. Suzanne Doughton (1993) specifically cites 
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Roosevelt’s rhetorical ability to “activate” the American people (p. 428). She found his first 
inaugural full of war imagery and metaphor to add a sense of drama and immediate concern to 
the predicament of the banking crisis and overall economic dilemma (p. 431). Though then the 
danger of the economic woe was very real, the American people needed a plan of action and a 
leader to execute it. In the Arsenal of Democracy Roosevelt used this type of language to bring 
the foreign war and danger home, to make it immediate and apparent. His language assisted in 
making the American public realize that Roosevelt had the prescribed action readily available 
for the winds of war. Roosevelt emulated past Americans, or a prophet telling the righteous 
people what to do to prepare for disaster. He was, as he did with the Banking Crisis, ready to 
lead them through the impending struggle against the fascist enemies waiting at their shores. 
From isolation to action 
 Roosevelt was well aware of the challenges he faced in persuading Americans to become 
involved in foreign matters. Davis Houck (2009) points to Roosevelt’s active role in Woodrow 
Wilson’s administration as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and long political resume, which 
bolstered his rhetorical credibility (p. 22). Roosevelt strategically gives voice to the isolationist 
sentiment and then reasons against it after he develops the new crisis, projecting the menace of 
the fascist enemy, threatening a geographically vulnerable United States of America. Part of his 
tactic involves the use of the rhetorical question that he could confidently respond to. Roosevelt 
asks, “Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack anywhere in the Americas 
while a free Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbor in the Atlantic? And does anyone 
seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our 
neighbors there?” (para. 19). Here, Roosevelt’s experience as the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for President Wilson assists his ethos for conveying the urgency of the situation. Within 
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the response to the rhetorical questions is where Roosevelt situates the dystopic vision of the 
future to come if America does not act against her aggressors. This leverages both his response 
as well as what is posited in his warnings of America’s inaction. If Britain falls and the Axis 
powers succeed in taking control of the entire Eastern hemisphere and seas, “It is no 
exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun--a 
gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military” (para. 20). Furthermore the 
American economy would forever turn into a “militaristic power on the basis of war economy” 
and permanently shift away from being an independent nation that could hold onto any 
isolationist policies (para. 21). It was better to face the threat, act immediately to support Great 
Britain, and stay distanced. 
 Roosevelt’s next appeal to move people beyond isolationist policy was to imply that it is an 
outdated way of being a nation in the world. His shrinking of the oceans was a way to express 
this, “Some of us [isolationists] like to believe that even if Britain falls, we are still safe, because 
of the broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific. But the width of those oceans is not what 
it was in the days of clipper ships” (para. 22-23). He juxtaposed this with how citizens should be 
approaching this new crisis and the European war: “During the past week many people in all 
parts of the nation have told me what they wanted me to say tonight. Almost all of them 
expressed a courageous desire to hear the plain truth about the gravity of the situation” (para. 
25). The later quote implies that these Americans, with the courage to hear the truth, are in the 
majority and will support the decision to keep America safe by supporting the British. This 
strategy of empowerment would enable America to keep their soldiers at home and keep the 
enemy across the Atlantic. 
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Epideictic call 
 Part of war rhetoric involves the epideictic function of informing citizens of their identity, 
world making, and the assignment of blame and praise simultaneously. Epideictic rhetoric is a 
speech of praise and blame. Describing the world in a particular way that illuminates the present 
situation and the American role in the European war was imperative. This is also part of the 
presidential justificatory function of the speech. Roosevelt simultaneously blamed the enemy 
and praised U.S. citizens as capable and gifted with foresight enough to see that action is 
demanded of them. Roosevelt had to prepare the country for war without directly declaring war. 
 Since the Arsenal address was so direct and clearly foretelling a significant change in 
United States policy, Roosevelt chose to include a telegram from a citizen who is blamed for 
having the wrong outlook on the situation. He used the example to justify inching the United 
States toward war in the Europe: 
 One telegram, however, expressed the attitude of the small minority who want to see no 
 evil and hear no evil, even though they know in their hearts that evil exists. That telegram 
 begged me not to tell again of the ease with which our American cities could be bombed 
 by any hostile power which had gained bases in this Western Hemisphere. The gist of that 
 telegram was: "Please, Mr. President, don't frighten us by telling us the facts." (para. 25) 
Roosevelt’s use of this quotation allowed him to respond to those in the country, whether a 
citizen or those in Congress, and inform them that they are wrong. Just as he implied with the 
“clipper ships” were no longer sailing the vast oceans, the isolationists’ view was an outdated 
way for Americans to view the world. An ocular metaphor comes in again while addressing the 
isolationists: 
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 There are those who say that the Axis powers would never have any desire to attack 
 the Western Hemisphere. That is the same dangerous form of wishful thinking which has 
 destroyed the powers of resistance of so many conquered peoples. The plain facts are that 
 the Nazis have proclaimed, time and again, that all other races are their inferiors and 
 therefore subject to their orders. And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth 
 of this American Hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all of the round world. 
 Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have 
 crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. 
 (para. 33-34) 
Roosevelt’s statements are points of connection and unification that furthers the construction of 
the “us” versus “them” dichotomy.  The dichotomy works to rally support from multiple and 
varied audiences because, according to Bates (2004): “If a people views itself as civilized (which 
nearly all do), then the savage should be seen as a threatening force in a universal sense” (p. 
454). Even the isolationists would agree that Americans should not be subject to Nazi rule and 
that America has valued commodities that would tempt a Nazi attack. John R. Butler (2002) 
contends that the development of a savage other is consistent with the history of the United 
States as a world power. The power hungry Nazi tiger is savage and will viciously rule. Enemy 
construction also involves features listed by Roger Bromley-“reductionism, simplification and 
essentialism” that the United States consistently engages in to describe the enemy (2011, p. 51). 
The reduction of Germans to animals or savages assist in forming the enemy and demonstrating 
the dangers it presents to the civilized group. The metaphor also enables better comprehension of 
a foreign threat.  
 This statement also works to construct a new, non-isolationist American identity. 
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Roosevelt defines Americans as defenders of democracy instead of people who took it for 
granted. Jason Flanagan’s (2004) critique of Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric recounts the “rhetorical 
restructuring of the American ‘self,’” that he describes as, “inextricably connected to the 
development of an enemy image” of Germany (p. 138). While describing the enemy, Wilson was 
concurrently constructing the image of America. Roosevelt similarly does that in On the Arsenal 
of Democracy and once more the Germans are the enemy (though Japanese and Italian threats 
are mentioned, they are not developed). Flanagan explains that, “Comparisons with the 
American Revolution ... also served to reinforce the image of the war as one between the forces 
of tyranny, represented by the German government, and the forces of liberty, represented by the 
United States” (p. 135). Tyranny versus Liberty fall into the categories that Ivie developed and 
make force the inevitable recourse for the situation. Ivie (1980) furthers this point by explaining 
that the construction of an enemy is useful to expiate guilt and “establish the enemy’s 
culpability,” which excuses the use of force while maintaining a wholesome and democratic 
identity (p. 280). Certainly Americans, who had thought of themselves as isolationists cautious 
of entering a European war again, would want to be seen as defenders rather than aggressors. 
Roosevelt understood such caution and framed the support of Britain as a way to avoid further 
involvement while maintaining democracy and freedom at home. 
 Roosevelt defined a new crisis, a menacing enemy, and a new proactive democratic 
identity in this speech. Here he explained that there are temptations to go along with the new 
regime the Nazis are proposing and how it is not in line with who Americans are: 
 These people not only believe that we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to the 
 fate of other nations. Some of them go much further than that. They say that we can and 
 should become the friends and even the partners of the Axis powers. Some of them even 
47 
 
 suggest that we should imitate the methods of the dictatorships. But Americans never can 
 and never will do that. (para. 37) 
The way to approach the European war is to maintain support for the last stands against the Axis 
powers. Roosevelt reinforced this stand with the consequences of inaction or continued 
isolationism with the dystopic future language:  
 They may talk of a "new order" in the world, but what they have in mind is only (but) a 
 revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope.  
 The proposed "new order" is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United 
 States of Asia. It is not a government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a 
 union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their 
 freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to 
 dominate and to enslave the human race. (para. 44-45) 
Roosevelt portrayed the enemy as vicious and deceptive. He mocks the Nazis’ “new order” 
mantra pointing to recent examples of other nations who were subsumed by Nazi powers such as 
Italy, Belgium, and Poland, nation that thought that they would be spared by nonintervention 
pacts. After establishing the threat, the identity of the enemy, and crafting a non-isolationist 
American identity, Roosevelt states the precise prescription and rationale behind the choice of 
action.  
The Present vision: Supporting Britain  
 Supporting Great Britain, one of the few allied powers not taken over by Nazi forces in 
Europe, was the prescribed action that had to be taken immediately. Roosevelt’s direct manner of 
speaking and detailed description of the Allied power constructed Britain as a friend and equal in 
the fight against world domination: 
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 The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. 
 They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters 
 which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. Emphatically we 
 must get these weapons to them, get them to them in sufficient volume and quickly 
 enough, so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which 
 others have had to endure. (para. 49) 
This is not an act of pity or an intervention, nor is that being asked of the Americans. The 
sacrifice is limited to sending armaments. Roosevelt compelled through empathy, believing that, 
Americans understood the physical sacrifice and loss of European wars from their involvement 
in WWI. This is the lowest level of risk Roosevelt saw for America and he made that explicit by 
stating, “Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away 
from our country and away from our people” (para. 54). The freshly proposed identity and role in 
international affairs was new so Roosevelt was careful not push the American audience too far 
toward war as he came to the conclusion of his address. The goal was to reassure them of their 
ability in the war effort but scare them into supporting the proposed action as well. The balance 
is struck rhetorically with the vision of the present situation. The example of visions from the 
banking crisis and their ability to pull through then is the assuagement that they can assist Britain 
in the fight to keep the war at bay. The dystopic future descriptions are intended to scare them 
out of isolation and ignorance of the real danger at their gates. The present vision takes on a 
deliberative function of Roosevelt’s veiled war rhetoric. The present exigence demanded action 
immediately, “We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency, and in its vast scale 
we must integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations which are resisting 
aggression” (para. 56). This was a demand for action that would still appease the American wish 
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to not join another European war--a clear recognition that World War I was still fresh in the 
mind of many isolationists. Indeed, at this point, Roosevelt prescribed action as a way to stay out 
of war and to only sacrifice a few luxury items that couldn’t be manufactured since production 
will shift largely to producing armaments.  
 Roosevelt describes the benefits of ramping up production and frames it as a nonissue for 
the economy. He assures listeners that the present situation which demands this response will not 
lead to an economic crisis again. The government would ensure the “stability of prices and with 
that the stability of the cost of living” since the American people’s support would largely depend 
on Roosevelt’s ability to allay anxieties (para. 63). The troubling memory of the banking crisis 
and the Great Depression that was still prominent in the minds of the American people, as well 
as part of part of Roosevelt’s ethos, both enabled and constrained the appeals and framing of this 
action: 
 Democracy's fight against world conquest is being greatly aided, and must be more  greatly 
aided, by the rearmament of the United States and by sending every ounce and every ton of 
munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the 
front lines. (para. 55) 
Once again he mentioned “Democracy’s fight” against the enemy and he lumped the United 
States in with the nations already involved. This supports the call for action again. The theme 
was repeated often and directly throughout the latter half of the address. He focused on the 
industry, weapons, and technology of war to frame the action as the least risky: “Guns, planes, 
and ships and many other things have to be built in the factories and the arsenals of America” 
(para. 64). He carefully constrains the potential for fear by focusing on the prescribed action and 
then nestles the action in a way to avoid an all-out war here: “We must be the great arsenal of 
50 
 
democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our 
task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and 
sacrifice as we would show were we at war” (para. 75). The call to action and seriousness as if 
the nation were at war echoes Roosevelt’s 1933 First Inaugural. The theme to take action 
immediately, both the Government and the people working together, is present in both speeches. 
Both speeches take place when the nation is either in crisis or on the precipice of one. Here 
Roosevelt speaks of the approach to the economic woes of 1933, “It can be accomplished in part 
by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency 
of a war, but at the same time, through this employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects 
to stimulate and reorganize the use of our natural resources” (First Inaugural, para. 9). Roosevelt 
made this statement after he described the economic issues as solvable. It was a problem that 
demanded immediate action to solve it and get Americans back to work.  
 Once again Roosevelt invoked the vigor and collective memories of a nation pulling 
together as if they were at war. The use of natural resources, the labor force, and getting the 
American people to work will solve the crisis that face the United States. The actions necessary 
required the approval of Congress, much like the declaration of war. Roosevelt reinforces the 
demands of war and the importance of leadership during a time of crisis again, “I shall ask the 
Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power to wage a 
war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact 
invaded by a foreign foe” (First Inaugural, para. 21). Though when the Arsenal of Democracy 
was given Roosevelt had not lead them through a war before, the American people would have 
already been familiar with Roosevelt’s invoking of war terms to familiarize them with the 
economic strife and conquering of that crisis. Roosevelt had already effectively “waged war” on 
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the Great Depression and brought them to victory once. His first inaugural laid important ground 
for the Arsenal Fireside Chat as Roosevelt had demonstrated his executive power as effective 
against the internal foe of economic strife (“www.archives.gov,” 2012, para. 4). The metaphor of 
war is a trend between these two speeches, only in The Arsenal of Democracy the move away 
from neutrality would indeed lead to involvement in a war abroad.  
 This focus on the supportive yet active role of America is essential to priming the nation 
for war and was reinforced by Roosevelt’s habit of invoking war to convey the meaning of crisis. 
He ends the address by saying, “As President of the United States I call for that national effort. I 
call for it in the name of this nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and 
proud to serve” (para. 81). Roosevelt reminds the public of his role and duty as the President to 
assist the rhetorical priming. By the end of The Arsenal of Democracy, the role of the people and 
the President was clear. He would lead the people through the new crisis he proposed as the 
present exigence while building upon the familiar foundation of the Banking Crisis to reassure 
them of his ability to do so. There was no way around Roosevelt’s presentation of the imminent 
dangers or any place to hide from the enemy. The American people would have to trust their 
leader to steer them again through the troubled waters of crisis. In this chapter I demonstrated 
that Roosevelt’s On the Arsenal of Democracy Fireside Chat is presidential justificatory war 
rhetoric cloaked in epideictic form. Furthermore, Roosevelt deploys enemy construction, 
geographic metaphors, and appeals to public memory in order to rhetorically prime the nation for 
war. Though explicitly stating that the Fireside Chat was not about war but rather about national 
security, Roosevelt was able to construct an enemy and an American public that was no longer 
isolationist, ready for war. To further this point, I examine citizen letters that Roosevelt received 
in response to the Fireside Chat and show how the rhetorical priming resonated with the public.  
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Chapter 4 The Effects of Roosevelt’s Rhetorical Priming 
Citizen Letters 
 
In what David M. Kennedy referred to as one of Roosevelt’s “most memorable Fireside 
Chats,” Roosevelt included the words of citizens to build his argument. He had gathered both 
public opinion and facts in order to confirm to the American people his commitment to Great 
Britain as well as his all measures short of war position regarding the European war (1999, p. 
468). Roosevelt engaged the American public before this particular address to find out what the 
general feeling was about the European war; furthermore this practice was a habit for Roosevelt 
to pay close attention to the correspondence he received in response to his public addresses. It 
offered valuable insight and strengthened his engagement with the public. 
Correspondence to the White House from citizens was common for Roosevelt ever since 
his first term in office. Roosevelt had staff dedicated to reading, recording the trends in the 
responses, and replying to the citizens who wrote letters to the president. Hauser remarked, 
“Roosevelt's Fireside Chats, however, are lessons on the possibilities of democracy when a 
leader addresses the masses with messages that actually have something to say. Roosevelt's 
monitoring of the mail enhanced his ability to engage citizens in terms that related to their 
problems and allowed them to understand what the government was considering to do about 
them” (1999, pp. 238-239). This practice was well established by Roosevelt’s third term. The On 
the Arsenal of Democracy address introduced one of the most ambitious international policy 
decisions of his presidency and, in the face of neutrality and intense isolationism, Roosevelt 
involved the public’s opinion heavily.  
A debate about Roosevelt’s position on the war sprung up immediately after the sixteenth 
Fireside Chat. Congress convened shortly after to assemble the Lend-Lease Bill H.R.—1776 to 
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aid Great Britain with armaments and materials (Kennedy, 1999, p. 470). According to Kennedy, 
“Fortunately for the president’s purposes, the debate over Lend-Lease took place at a favorable 
moment. England’s apparent victory in the Battle of Britain had fended off the threat of 
immediate invasion, and Roosevelt’s recent electoral victory had freshened his political 
popularity. As the debate began, public opinion polls showed solid majorities behind the 
president’s Lend-Lease policy” (1999, p. 470). This is supported by the vast amount of mail and 
telegrams filled with messages of approval of the president’s position that poured in the evening 
of the address and for up to two weeks afterward. These excerpts reflect the manner in which 
Roosevelt’s rhetorical priming resonated with the public. 
 There are 14.3 boxes full of letters, postcards, and telegraphs from citizens in response to 
Roosevelt’s On the Arsenal of Democracy Fireside Chat. The boxes are full of approximately 
500 to 750 pages each. Letter writing was a common way to respond to the President’s addresses 
to the pubic. Fourteen of the boxes in the President’s Personal File #200 contain what the 
archivists label “pro” letters. In the partial box, that is a third full, are citizen responses labeled 
“con” letters.  
In the following chapter I present a sampling of the citizen response to the sixteenth 
Fireside Chat. The letters gauge the response to the address in a revealing way. While the 
response is overwhelmingly positive, there were letters that expressed the concerns from the 
dissenting citizens. The dissenting letters offer a balance to the perspective about changing 
America’s neutrality policy that had been in effect since Hitler took power of Germany. The 
letters are evidence of how the rhetorical priming succeeded and how it missed parts of the 
public. With millions of listeners from every corner of the nation, the letters provide rich insight 
into what was on the minds of those huddled around their radios for Roosevelt’s address on 
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national security. For the critic, the letters signal the effect of the letters on the populous and 
display the turn in policy and support for an America engaged as “the great arsenal of 
democracy” in the European war. First I demonstrate the “pro” side of the citizen response. Four 
prominent themes are present in the letters. First and most pronounced is the message of full 
support for Roosevelt’s stance regarding the European war. Second is that the United States is 
great and blessed. Third, many of the letters remark that the speech itself is great and stands out 
among the numerous speeches Roosevelt had made during his three terms. Finally, a concern 
about Fifth Columnist or generally subversive agents being present and active in the United 
States that may work against Roosevelt’s plan to aid Great Britain was expressed.  
Full Support for the Arsenal of Democracy 
Many of the “pro” letters in the archive note that they fully supported Roosevelt’s 
position on the European war. Many citizens wrote because they knew the president would 
measure the success of the address upon the correspondence received. There was also a swell of 
popularity for the stance introduced in the address in polls taken about the Lend-Lease program. 
Roosevelt’s timing and use of the familiar Fireside Chat medium seemed to resonate with many 
citizens who wrote to him. One gentlemen, Matthew R. Hitch, wrote on December 30, 1940 from 
New Bedford, Massachusetts, “As the effect of a pronouncement from a high official of the 
Government to the Nation seems to be measured in part by the mail received concerning it, I will 
add to the number of those who unreservedly commend your Fireside Talk of Sunday night.” 
 The rhetorical priming and message of Roosevelt’s ability to lead resonated with many. 
The following five excerpts are examples of that. The Czech American National Alliance from 
Toledo, Ohio wrote in a telegram that was sent to the White House on January 6, 1941, “We 
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thank you for your truly American stand you revealed in your last Fireside Chat. Proudly with 
admiration we stand behind you. You lead, we follow. God bless you, you bless America.” 
 The evening of the address, secretary S.T.E., on behalf of Senator Gibson of Vermont, in 
a Memorandum for the President stated, “Senator Gibson of Vermont called. Said your radio talk 
last night was ‘100% good!’ and then he said, ‘Tell the President I am FOR him!” The political 
support would be important for the bill to go into law and allow support to Great Britain 
materialize. 
On December 30, 1940 Harold L. Ireland from Portland, Oregon wrote, “Many of my 
friends as well as myself and my wife who heard you over the radio last night thoroughly 
approve of your stand and we desire to back you up 100%. We sincerely trust that you will 
continue to take the leadership for all possible to aid to Britain. If a poll were to be taken of all 
your constituents I am sure you would have a backing of more than 90%. You need have no fear 
in this direction and you can well afford to proceed towards the quickest kind of aid to England 
knowing that it will meet with the hearty approval of most all citizens.” 
The evening of the address, Leo Lowy sent a telegram, “Mr. President as a pilot and 
aircraft inspector I wish to express my deepest appreciation and fullest accord with your 
statements of tonight and can also assure you of the same sentiments of thousands of co workers 
of mine.” His profession allowed him to confirm for himself the statements about modern 
bomber capabilities that Roosevelt cited as evidence that the oceans were not enough of a 
deterrent for attacks from either Germany or Japan. War and sending armaments abroad were 
now on the minds of these supportive citizens. 
On December 31, 1940 E.H. Norris and Mrs. Norris from Kingston, New Mexico wrote, 
“We, Mrs. Norris and I, listened with profound interest to your broadcast of December 29. It 
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was, without doubt, the most clear statement yet uttered by any individual in these United States, 
and defined to the majority of your countrymen exactly the position they have hoped that you 
and the entire government body would take toward solving the world crisis. In passing, it is our 
sincere wish that you will receive without hesitation the supreme support of every Senator and 
every Congressman down to the last man, for such is the will of every true American.” This 
couple expressed their understanding of the address and the Congressional process that lay 
ahead. The support of the citizens was something that Roosevelt could rely upon for evidence to 
Congress against the isolationist and Republicans who had waited for him to make a mistake. 
Some citizens accurately sensed that war was not far behind this move in international 
policy. December 29, 1940, John B. Morrill expressed his vested interest and willingness to 
sacrifice for the president’s position and extended support for the arsenal as well as full 
engagement in this telegram, “One boy in Navy another in in August. Heard your message. 
Agreed hundred percent. Declare war when necessary. I am Navy yard worker. Charleston we 
the people are behind you. Help my boy to Annapolis. Appreciate your friendly talk.” These 
messages reveal that the priming message of sacrifice had struck an empathetic chord. 
Furthermore, the looming specter of WWI was grim but not insurmountable rhetorically. 
On January 1, 1941 a World War I veteran named Otto W. Hammer from New 
Springfield, Ohio wrote a lengthy letter to the president:  
There were six in our particular group who listened to your talk last Sunday and each of 
us heartily approved the stand taken and your plans for the future. No one wants to go to 
war, but what can we do to prevent? –seemed to be the gist of our discussion following 
your speech. Certainly the only way we can stay out of this war is to render all possible 
aid to Great Britain, for if they lose, we either “sink or swim” –surrender or fight. In all 
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fairness, sincerity and good common sense, how can Senator Wheeler or any one else 
arrive at the conclusion (with past events to guide us) that Hitler will peaceably agree to 
surrender to their peoples of the lands he has invaded and practically ruined and take 
himself and his armies within the boundaries of pre-war Germany? Then finally our 
group came to the conclusion that probably the most effective way to win this war would 
be to have our country on a war basis, actually declare war on these axis powers and by 
that very act arouse industry, labor and the public at large to the seriousness of the 
situation and at the same time stop the silly and meaningless arguments advanced by the 
“peace-at-any-cost people. 
 
Furthermore Mr. Hammer also firmly situated himself as a man who has seen war and is an 
American willing to do whatever he needed to help. “This letter comes to you as just an 
ordinary citizen- a court stenographer by trade who was in the army for about a year during the 
World War and who, incidentally, is wondering just what he could possibly do to help.” Though 
the situation was daunting, many Americans were behind Roosevelt and found his leadership 
comforting in the face of a world crisis. 
A Blessed Nation 
 Another theme that was prominent was the notion that the United States was a great and 
blessed nation that should extend help. Citizens also wrote that Roosevelt should be blessed for 
his leadership and was reminded that the citizenry had faith in him. The evening of the address 
Edwin E. White from Pleasant Hill, Tennessee wrote, “As a plain citizen, I am grateful for the 
superb address to the nation that you have just made. It was beyond praise in conception, 
wording, and delivery. Surely the time for hesitation is past. Our one hope to preserve our 
liberties, under God, is to aid Britain to the utmost in every possible way. Some of us will be 
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exceedingly happy to see this the established policy of America. Why have we been so signally 
blessed among nations if we are not to put our resources into the defense of the great human 
achievements of freedom, justice, and decency? Why not keep the nation informed as to the 
actual facts? I believe it will back you to the limit if you do.” Picking up on the named enemy in 
his letter and with the ethos of being a Reverend this gentleman, Rev. W. N. Lowrance from 
Oxford, Mississippi wrote on December 31, 1940, “Your Fireside address hit the nail squarely on 
the head. We must stand for the right regardless. Blinding ourselves to the truth and pulling the 
cover over our head will only help to make bad matters worse. Nazism must crumble and we 
must help it crumble. God is with the righteous. He cannot be with the gangsters.” 
 The evilness of the foe Roosevelt constructed resonated with this gentleman as well. On 
January 1, 1941 Pastor Rev. D’Arcy G. Cook from Providence, R.I. commended Roosevelt, “I 
want to indorse every word of your speech last Sunday evening. It is the sentiment of nearly all 
the people I meet. Christian people cannot be neutral in the presence of evil. Christ called the 
Pharisees vipers and hypocrites, and Hitler is a double crossing lyer, a cruel murdering gangster, 
a bloated power loving monster depriving nations of liberty, and cowardly enough to blame 
others for his own crimes.” Making clear that he understood that the best way to defeat and 
correct Hitler Cook also stated, “It is our best insurance to help Britain in every way. We trust 
you to find the best way. We will support you in courageous action.” Action and trust were 
strong calls in the Fireside Chat.  
December 30, 1940, Francis M. McDermott sent a telegram from Barranquilla, 
Columbia, “Please accept my heartiest congratulations for the masterful speech you gave last 
night. As I looked at your picture and listened to your voice I was proud indeed that we have 
such a brave and able President. God bless you and best wishes for a Happy New Year.” The 
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address was broadcast internationally; the priming had a long reach through the medium of the 
radio. This letter responds to the priming as well as Mr. McDermott’s fondness of the Fireside 
Chats and Roosevelt’s radio addresses in general. 
Another telegram sent the evening of the address from Jacob Ilowite expressed a similar 
sentiment, “God bless you for your clear and honest analysis of our position in this terrible war. 
May your health and strength sustain you so you can steer us safely out of chaos now 
confronting our country and the world.” Though Roosevelt does not use religious language in the 
address, citizens felt compelled to put the call to be The Arsenal of Democracy in religious terms. 
Enemy construction places the dichotomy of good versus evil on the situation and the priming of 
action as well as the new role America would have is expressed well by citizen through their use 
of religious language.  
A Great Speech 
The citizens were used to hearing Roosevelt often on the radio but this speech in 
particular stood out to a few of those who wrote to him. Though a plain spoken and direct orator, 
Roosevelt was a popular president. This was due in part because people enjoyed his addresses 
immensely. On December 30, 1940, A.E. Clampitt of Saginaw, Michigan discerned, “I think 
your speech of last evening will go down in history with Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg speech, 
as two of the greatest ever uttered by an American citizen. I am sure the great majority of the 
American people thank God we have a man like you at the head of our government.” Lincoln, 
also a war time president, was notable for his addresses to a divided nation. 
 Spyrous P. Skouras, President, Greek War Associations from New York wrote in on 
December 31, 1940, “Dear Mr. President: May I extend my wholehearted congratulations on 
your splendid talk Sunday night. Your profound observations the sound judgment and foresight 
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that impelled your remarks on American policy is admirable and on behalf of all identified with 
this movement may I express our deep gratitude for the inspiration and impetus that your words 
have given us to bring to a small but valiant nation all material and spiritual support that 
American generosity and sympathy can provide.” Here the speech itself and the action to send 
support to Britain are lauded simultaneously. The epideictic call is being responded to. 
December 30, 1940 Catesby L. Jones of Bernardsville, New Jersey wrote that 
Roosevelt’s speech was so great that even Republicans who did not support him were won over 
by it. “Your speech last night was one of the greatest of many great speeches you have made. 
Your words will infuriate our foreign enemies and our domestic traitors, will shame our narrow 
isolationists, will clear the thinking of many muddled minds, and will inspire the vast majority of 
our citizens who are intelligent and patriotic to greater vigilance and greater sacrifice. In the 
Republican stronghold of Bernardsville, New Jersey, where I live, I heard this morning nothing 
but praise for what you said—than which nothing more laudatory can be said.” This reflects the 
political tensions as well as the predominant isolationist sentiment in the country. 
 George Watts Hill from Durham, North Carolina thought it was the greatest of all of 
Roosevelt’s speeches. On December 29, 1940 via telegram he said, “Please accept my sincere 
congratulations on the outstanding speech of your three terms of office. The general public in 
this part of the state heartily endorse your position of all aid to Britain as the best defense for 
America and sincerely appreciate your telling them the true facts of the situation. Many had 
expressed the feeling that they hoped you would in the very near future declare a state of 
emergency and thereby eliminate many of the subversive activities of semi-political Nazi 
organizations such as ‘The Tourist Bureau’ etc.” The latter portion of this telegram brings me to 
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the final theme that was prevalent in the correspondence in response to the Fireside Chat: the fear 
of Fifth Column activities that were already at work within the bounds of the United States. 
The Threat From Within 
 The letters to Roosevelt revealed that the portion of On the Arsenal of Democracy that 
directly addressed the threat of Fifth Columnists and subversive agents from Germany already 
well rooted in the United States that may have already caused delay to assist Great Britain struck 
a chord with Americans.  
The evening of the address Francis S. Finch of Omaha, Nebraska sent a telegram, “I feel 
you are fundamentally right this nation cannot last without England and that you have expressed 
tonight in far more adequate than I will ever know the crisis that confronts us today. I may add 
however that we have those certain subversive influences in our own ranks who should be 
corrected to enable you and me to achieve the action we are seeking. The right to preserve as a 
nation and with your leadership untrammeled it will be obtained.” Mr. Finch was concerned as 
well that those who were not in favor of the action proposed by Roosevelt were part of a plot to 
keep American aid from Great Britain in order to aid the German win there.  
 Even extending assistance to keep the Fifth Columnists from succeeding in their 
subversive ways in the United States were offered to Roosevelt. January 1, 1941,The Kiwanis 
Club of Roswell, New Mexico sent this letter authored by their secretary Edward L. Harbaugh, 
“The Roswell Kiwanis Club votes unanimously to support your preparedness program and to 
congratulate you on a firm stand relative to the world situation. We are ready to assist in any way 
possible and urge strong action against fifth columnist activities in our country.” The message 
was clear that the presence of subversive agents was not in the address alone, the citizens felt it 
too. 
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The Dissenting Yet Patriotic Citizens 
 Not all of the correspondence was supportive of Roosevelt’s plan to aid Great Britain. 
There were those who thought that America should not become involved in European affairs and 
were unswayed by the rhetorical priming for war. From parents, concerned citizens, ministers, 
businessmen, World War I veterans, and young men who would be eligible to fight, citizens 
expressed their dissent to Roosevelt through letters. Though the address was meant to assuage 
the fear of going to war, these citizens saw through the call to merely become an “arsenal of 
democracy.”  
Themes arise from the sample of letters. From the partial box coded “con” in the Franklin 
D. Roosevelt archives there are a few distinct messages that come through. First, and the 
strongest, is the memory of the United States’ involvement in the First World War. Many 
citizens wrote to Roosevelt warning him that their support for him has dropped because he wants 
to involve the United States in another European war. Roosevelt’s exclusion of the topic had not 
blocked the memory of the Great War. The main support for this fear was the memory of how 
poorly World War I went and the devastation of that war still lingered when they were writing. 
Second, distrust in England and the war abroad not being worth the sacrifice at home. Third, that 
Roosevelt’s address was in fact a declaration of war and not a simple extension of aid. The 
citizens heard the Fireside Chat as a declaration of war in spite of Roosevelt’s clear statement 
that it was not an address about war. Overall each citizen makes it clear that they love their 
country and there is a deep vein of patriotism that runs through each of the letters. The ethos of 
citizenry and their love of country is what gave them the right to, in most cases, respectfully 
disagree with the President’s stance on the European war. 
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The Remembrance of World War I 
On January 6, 1941, a self-proclaimed “disillusioned world war veteran,” D.M. Batton 
from Charleston, S.C. wrote, “Your address is very much like those delivered by former, 
President, Woodrow Wilson in 1916 and 1917 when he waged a successful campaign to have our 
country become embroiled in the European war. Like Wilson, you probably will succeed, but 
also, like Wilson, you will go out of office the most hated man in the United States.” 
Furthermore, Mr. Batton warns that the fate of France is telling of what will happen if the United 
States becomes more involved, “While you lead my country into a war which the people, like 
those of France, do not want, and will not prosecute successfully. You must remember that 
million of young men upon whom you must depend to do the fighting have been without 
employment for years. There may be a question in their mind whether Democracy is worth 
fighting for.” Clearly the American public still felt the presence of the First World War and some 
were not naïve to where Roosevelt’s priming would lead. 
Distrust in England 
 Many citizens did not trusting of England, due to the United States’ involvement with 
them during the First World War. Moreover, it was expressed that they did not view Great 
Britain as worthy of American aid. On December 31, 1940 Geoff W.Armbruch expressed his 
concern that Britain might even be an enemy rather than a friend by calling on the United States 
to become involved in foreign affairs. In the second paragraph the citizen asks, “What did Britain 
ever do for us?” The citizen points to the United States’ past bondage to Britain and expresses 
the need for the U.S. to stay untangled from Britain. “All I ask of you is please don’t be British 
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or pro-British” (underlined words in original letter). This suggests the formation of collective 
nations who America should be allied with missed the mark. 
 William R. Gentry, Jr. from St. Louis, Missouri wrote on January 1, 1941, “Sir: I listened 
with dismay to your radio address on December 29. It amounted to a declaration of war, and we 
are far from ready for such action. Your pledge about not sending a force abroad cannot be 
kept.” He then expressed that Churchill has mislead the president, “England has ample funds to 
pay for all she gets from us, and I oppose any leasing arrangement for her benefit. She made 
some very solemn promises to us before, and broke every one of them; what makes you think she 
will carry out her engagements better this time? Please do not misunderstand me: I dislike the 
Nazis as much or more than you do. But England brought this trouble on herself, and I see no 
reason for us to send our young men to her aid. And unless we do this very thing, all of our other 
efforts on her behalf will be worthless.” Mr. Gentry acknowledged the enemy construction of the 
Nazi foe but is still not moved to support the actions proposed in the Fireside Chat. 
Geo W. Meartz of Niagra Falls, NY sent a telegram on December 31, 1940 stating, “One 
who rose up out of a nest of Republicans to vote for you seven weeks ago deeply deplores your 
talk on the war. …Believe we may fight in self defense alone with justice.” In a reference to a 
prior address from Roosevelt, Mr. Meartz extended his argument to demonstrate his distrust of 
Great Britain and the president’s motives, “I wonder if your British friends know anything of the 
golden rule you spoke of Christmas. It would have been well if you had told your son Elliott 
something about the golden rule. Maybe he would not have accepted a job in a swivel chair five 
thousand miles from where any battle would take place. And only the British. And the British 5th 
columnists in the United States and cowards are afraid of Hitler.” Here the Fifth Column 
suspicions work in the opposite direction of the “pro” letters. The sentiment is that there are 
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British installments lurking in the company of the president in an attempt to get the United States 
involved and on the side of the British. 
An Undesirable Declaration of War 
 Many citizens saw the Fireside Chat as an end to Roosevelt’s commitment to neutrality 
and his all methods short of war approach that had held since 1939. The Administrative Staff of 
American Youth Conference Congress of Chicago sent a telegram on December 29, 1940 that 
stated, “We are deeply shocked by your warlike speech and your proposal to shackle American 
labor to a war economy as patriotic American we pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to 
keep America free democratic and at peace.” The rhetorical priming for war had the opposite 
effect in this case and the following excerpt. 
 Mrs. O. Bandler from Detroit, Michigan wrote on December 31, 1940, “I am in full 
agreement with a program of aid to England, but feel aid should be extended only so long as it 
does not endanger our becoming embroiled in this European mess. Inasmuch as you presented 
the danger that lies in our not helping England, and I well know there are two sides to the 
problem, I sincerely feel, however, as a true American, that the mightiest of armies and the most 
powerful of navies would more than offset any threats of Nazi Germany.” Here the priming only 
moved Mrs. O. bandler so far. War is still undesirable and sending armaments are simply not 
worth the risk. 
 On December 30, 1940, Dean Mullin of Grand Junction, CO. wrote, “Sir: Your speech 
last evening made it fairly clear to anyone capable of reading between the lines that you have 
resolved to take this country into war. Even though such expressions were not actually used, the 
impression conveyed, not so much perhaps by what was said but the manner of presentation, was 
that war had been decided upon. And of one of those most directly concerned, I wish to file a 
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protest. I write as on of the Sixteen million whom you have marked for the slaughter in this 
conflict. …I have a feeling that I am being deliberately herded into a war for which I certainly 
have no liking and which will doubtless be recorded by historians of the future as one of the most 
colossal mistakes in American history.” As someone who would be sent to fight if the United 
States involvement escalated to conflict, this citizen was deeply concerned that the war was 
inevitable and he did not want to fight. He is also picking up on the veiled nature of the address. 
Thought Roosevelt frames the address as one about national security, the priming suggests that 
war is inevitable. 
 Similarly, George and Martha Messinger from Bowmansville, NY wrote to the president 
on December 31, 1940, “Dear Sir: We listened to your speech over the radio and are very much 
afraid such talk will get us into war. We are the parents of five sons and have told them to give 
the last drop of their blood in defense of their country but to refuse to leave these shores to fight 
the battles of European countries.” The Messingers also disliked the strong anti-German tones in 
the Fireside Chat. “You seem to forget that we are not all of English descent, many of us are of 
German descent, and while we have no admiration for Hitler or any other dictator, our hearts 
sympathize with the sufferings of the German people as well as the English people. We would 
admire you more had you, as the head of a great nation, tried to make peace instead of calling 
ugly names and thus arousing hate toward this country.” Though there were fewer dissenting 
voices present in the archives, the arguments were no less passionate than those who Roosevelt 
had won support. Those who were not won over by Roosevelt’s rhetorical priming were 
convinced that war was the only option once the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred. America, 
whether the public unanimously supported it or not, was attacked and going to war. 
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Rhetorical Priming Reflected in the Official Declarations of War 
Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War: The Japanese Enemy 
 In July of 1937 war broke out in Asia when Japan invaded China. The American people 
read about it in the newspapers and heard Roosevelt give speeches about the Asian Axis 
aggressors. In October of that year Roosevelt informed the American people, who were 
sympathetic to China, that quarantine was enforced upon Japan for their aggressive acts 
(Herring, 1938, p. 22). Depriving Japan, who the United States was friendly with, of resources 
they could use to further their war pursuits and remain neutral, was the goal of this quarantine. It 
also kept Roosevelt’s promise of all methods short of war strategy.  
 Though the American public was aware of Japan’s aggression in Asia they were not 
concerned about the threat that Roosevelt was keenly attuned to. Unlike other Fifth Columnist 
fears of the day, such as German spies who worked for the Nazis to gain intelligence and keep 
the isolationist sentiment alive, the American people were not concerned that there were 
subversive Japanese workings inside the United States (MacDonnell, 1995, p. 82). In 1938 
Roosevelt pushed to enlarge the Navy presence of the United States in the Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans. In May of 1940, the main body of the Navy was sent to Hawaii as a stark warning to 
Japan (Kennedy, 1999, p. 446). While Roosevelt could not declare officially at that point, he did 
not want the Japanese Imperial Navy to think they were unprepared, weak, or naïve to the threat 
they presented in the Pacific. For many American citizens, the attack was a complete surprise. It 
was only afterward that it was thought of as the most effective Fifth Columnist work of the entire 
war (MacDonnell, 1995, p. 85). 
 World War II had finally reached American soil on December 7, 1941, one year after 
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Roosevelt had warned the American people that they must become involved in order to stop the 
Nazis in their tracks in Europe. The attack on the main body of the Navy at Pearl Harbor that 
morning took American lives and was meant to cripple the Navy so they could not counter attack 
against Japan. On December 8, 1941 Roosevelt approached Congress and the American people 
with his declaration of war against Japan. This time the American people were ready to go to war 
and fully engage in the Pacific. 
 First I demonstrate Roosevelt’s construction of the Japanese enemy. Second, I provide 
examples of how Roosevelt used memory, recent and further back, to build his case against the 
Japanese enemy. He bridged the enemy construction with the recent past to explain the nature of 
the situation of the present for the American people. He also, since the nation was officially 
declaring war, needed to reaffirm the national identity as capable of fighting and winning. Lastly 
I demonstrate Roosevelt’s epideictic notions of America and the foe he built in contrast to let the 
identity of America at war shine through. 
 The enemy construction in the declaration of war is more brief in nature than it was in the 
On the Arsenal of Democracy address. Roosevelt has the recent attack to lean on for evidence 
that Japan is a foe that should be dealt with directly and swiftly. He begins by naming the enemy 
in the first paragraph of the speech as, “the Empire of Japan” (para. 1). This way of naming the 
enemy marks them as different than the United States, which is a democracy. The term “Empire” 
is loaded with negative connotations for the American people. It is also a label of foreignness or 
otherness that furthers the division between the two countries’ political and governing systems. 
Empire suggests that one holds dominion over the rest and, since the American public would 
have been fairly uneducated about the Japanese people, this label did not conflict with 
preexisting notions about Japan. Roosevelt had to wait for the right moment to name the 
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Germans as an enemy the year prior, there was now no need for caution or delay. 
 Roosevelt also builds the motive for the Japanese attack as deceptive and strategic. This 
allowed the American public to further understand why war was the only option. After Roosevelt 
described the attacks as “sudden” and “deliberate,” he went further to illuminate the relationship 
that preceded the attacks (para. 1). Roosevelt explains, “The United States was at peace with that 
Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its 
Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific” (para. 2). Roosevelt makes it 
clear that the attacks were an act of war and part of the Axis plan that he previewed the year 
before in On the Arsenal of Democracy. The attacks were part of the world domination that he 
told the American people were at work in Europe and Asia. In the Arsenal address he warned, 
“Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But 
it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain 
control of the oceans which lead to this hemisphere” (On the Arsenal of Democracy, 1940, para. 
16). The “Asiatic war-makers” were now doing what he had feared, taking over the Pacific 
Ocean. Next, he builds the timeline and geographically located the danger of what the attacks on 
Pearl Harbor mean for the United States. 
 Roosevelt constructs a memory in the address and he begins the speech by marking the 
date of the attacks themselves as significant. “Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will 
live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval 
and air forces of the Empire of Japan” (para. 1). With this statement he begins to simultaneously 
craft a timeline and call upon the past even though it was not so distant-to build his argument 
against Japan. Marking the event as significant enough for war was not where Roosevelt stopped 
in his address. He makes it clear that the day will live in infamy and that the American people 
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will always remember the threat of the Japanese, “But always will our whole Nation remember 
the character of the onslaught against us” (para. 12). These statements in the war declaration 
affirm the attacks-date, time, and place- as important and noteworthy for all time. This along 
with the timeline provided evidence for his claim that the Japanese had indeed declared war and 
were building up their offensive in the Pacific Ocean. It also helps make the American entry into 
the war appear clearly provoked and necessary beyond questioning from isolationists or the 
remaining public who still were resistant to war. The day has indeed, as Roosevelt proclaimed, 
lived on in infamy and is still referenced as the first of the United States’ involvement in World 
War II. The words in Roosevelt’s official war declaration, unlike the steps to aid Great Britain 
and to be “the great arsenal of democracy” that he ascribed to the national identity in 1940, have 
been the most memorable (On the Arsenal of Democracy, 1940, para. 75).  
 The timeline Roosevelt crafts not only assists his argument to go to war, it also works to 
cement the event into the cultural memory of the United States. Roosevelt uses the recent events 
that occurred the day before in the Pacific to construct an argument and mark it as significant 
enough to bring the United States fully into World War II. Interestingly Roosevelt’s argument 
moves with an outward trajectory of attacks from the West Coast of the United States out to the 
Pacific Islands that were hit by the Japanese Imperial forces. This movement and geographical 
metaphor for the danger and strategy that the Japanese had pulled off aided in the comprehension 
of the events and what they all meant together for the American public. This is where 
Roosevelt’s style and method of presentation is rather remarkable. By moving outward 
geographically, he isolated the strategy in a way that would resonate with the American people. 
He begins with the attacks on Pearl Harbor:   
 The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American 
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 naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been 
 lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between 
 San Francisco and Honolulu. Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack 
 against Malaya. Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night Japanese 
 forces attacked Guam. Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. Last 
 night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. And this morning the Japanese attacked 
 Midway Island. (para. 4-9) 
He moves outward from Hawaii out to the Pacific Ocean at Midway Island. This illustration 
demonstrates that the Pacific Ocean, much like Europe, had been overwhelmed by the Axis 
powers. This goes back to his description in On the Arsenal of Democracy of what the Nazies did 
in Europe and Africa. The dual nature of this argument, that simultaneously builds the heinous 
nature of the enemy and supports his call for war, brilliantly calls upon the geography of the 
Pacific Ocean to affirm his work done in the opening paragraphs of the address. This use of 
geography is similar to the times he deployed it in his arguments in the Arsenal address. The 
geographically based arguments from the prior year sound most like Roosevelt’s argument when 
he makes it sound like common military strategy because of distance to attack Pearl Harbor, “It 
will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was 
deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago” (para. 3). This aids the American people to 
see that the proximity of Japan to United States soil made them an Axis target much as Roosevelt 
had warned them one year earlier. The oceans that Roosevelt made clear were insufficient to 
guard them from attack were now being invaded and taken over by the Asiatic war-maker they 
heard about in the Arsenal address. 
 War rhetoric is one part epideictic and one part deliberative rhetoric. The decision to go to 
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war is evident in the speech and Roosevelt made his case well. As Roosevelt stated, “The facts of 
yesterday and today speak for themselves” (para. 10). It was what Roosevelt said in the war 
declaration that echoed what he established in the Arsenal address about the identity and people 
of the United States that stands out more than the argument for war. There is a distinct flow in 
this war declaration. First, Roosevelt established who the enemy was. Second, Roosevelt crafted 
a timeline and placed the attacks firmly within the national memory. Lastly his epideictic 
affirmation of the American people.  
 Unlike Roosevelt’s urging the American people to trust in his leadership in the Arsenal 
address, he assigns them autonomy. The American people had just witnessed to the savagery and 
true might of the enemy so he knew they would know that the attack meant action had to be 
taken. “The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand 
the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation” (para. 10). This tone is markedly 
different from the one he had taken the year before. The preceding year Roosevelt had to awaken 
the public to the threats that lay in either direction. Now the enemy was on American soil and 
killing both armed personnel and civilians alike. Roosevelt does however let the American 
people know that he is prepared for his station as Commander in Chief and was acting alongside 
the will of the people when he approached the Congress to declare war. That is most clear when 
Roosevelt says, “I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert 
that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form 
of treachery shall never again endanger us” (para. 13). The treachery that he spoke of was clearly 
that of the Axis forces. The attack against the United States described that way also made a 
statement about the nature of the force that the United States would use to ensure that they would 
be safe on their soil, that it would be righteous and expected since they had been attacked so 
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fiendishly.  
 This is further affirmed when Roosevelt describes the capabilities of the American armed 
forces, despite the devastating blow to the Navy that the Japanese Imperial forces had just 
committed. “With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our 
people—we will gain the inevitable triumph, so help us God” (para. 15). Between the armed 
forces of the United States and the will of God, they will march into battle and succeed in 
keeping the American people safe. This last statement made it clear that America was on the 
righteous side of the battle. The Axis powers, who were clearly made out to be evil enemies in 
the Arsenal address and the opening section of the formal war declaration, were on the wrong 
side of the war and their quest for world domination was without merit. In this address, the 
religious allusion of good and evil are explicit. If it was not clear in every Americans mind after 
the December 1940 address, it was clear now. The Axis powers had to be stopped or America 
and democracies all around the world would fall. But more importantly, as Roosevelt had set as a 
precedent in the Arsenal address, Americans were more than capable to be a commanding force 
in this war. 
Message to Congress Requesting War Declarations with Germany and Italy 
 On December 11, 1941 Roosevelt requested that Congress declare war on Germany and 
Italy. This request followed Germany and Italy’s formal declarations of war against the United 
States that occurred earlier that day. The address is short, a mere eight sentences to be precise. I 
argue that this is a brief address not only because Germany and Italy had already declared war 
against the United States but also because Roosevelt had already built his case against Germany 
the year before.  
 For Roosevelt, the Germans were the biggest threat to the United States because they had 
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the most advanced military and he saw Hitler as the most determined to dominate the globe 
(Casey, 2001, p. 9). The German enemy was clearly the focus of the Arsenal address and the 
American people would have been familiar with the German enemy at the time the declaration of 
war went public. The Germans had taken over large swaths of Europe, which was reported in the 
United States in newspapers, but were stalled in Russia with their attempts to take over Moscow 
when Roosevelt formally declared war against them (“worldwar2.net,” 2012). This tone of world 
domination is present in the first line of the address, “On the morning of December eleventh, the 
Government of Germany, pursuing its course of world conquest, declared war against the United 
States” (Roosevelt, line 1). Roosevelt was well aware of the Nazi plan for the world because he 
had been watching them toil in Europe to build an army and gradually take over as much land 
across the Atlantic as they could since 1939.  According to Casey (2001),“In January 1939, he 
[Roosevelt] told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the administration now had ‘rather 
definite information as to what the ultimate objective of Hitler was, namely, ‘world domination,’ 
which would proceed step by step until Germany had effected ‘the gradual encirclement of the 
U.S. by the removal of its first line of defense’”(p. 9). The Axis powers had successfully dealt a 
devastating blow directly to the United States in the Pacific and the British forces were barely 
able to hold the Nazis back in Europe and Africa. Roosevelt’s fears expressed warnings to the 
public had become a stark and upsetting reality.  
 The rhetorics of enemy construction in this declaration are meager but striking. Roosevelt 
effectively summarized the German threat and said very little about Italy. This could be because  
Italy was considered a “satellite” of Nazi Germany with a meager military presence (Kluckhohn, 
New York Times, 1941). Roosevelt effectively lauds the United States and all other democratic 
states in Europe while condemning the German enemy, “Rapid and united effort by all of the 
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peoples of the world who are determined to remain free will insure a world victory of the forces 
of justice and of righteousness over the forces of savagery and of barbarism” (line 6). This 
combination of enemy rhetoric and epideictic rhetoric, one component of war rhetoric, provided 
the nation with an affirmed notion of their character in opposition to the enemy who Roosevelt 
characterized as savage and barbarous. This is in line with the trends that Ivie (1980) revealed in 
his study of presidential justificatory rhetoric. Roosevelt developed a binary of “justice” and 
“savagery,” “righteousness” and “barbarism” (line 6). This binary intensified the sentiment of 
“us” vs. “them” as well as constructed the enemy as the polar opposite of the American people. 
Reducing the enemy to evil constrains the approach to them. War became the only option and 
served to strike up further patriotism in the face of danger, unity against a foe, and affirms the 
morality of defending one’s own nation as well as the democratic states around the world.  
 The most striking allusion to the Arsenal address is when Roosevelt demonstrated that 
Germany and Italy declaring war upon the United States was expected. The German enemy 
Roosevelt established the year prior was actively aggressive in a direct and clear way that the 
American people could not ignore. Roosevelt’s dystopic future of the Nazi reach extending 
across the oceans had come to fruition. “The long known and the long expected has thus taken 
place. The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving toward this 
hemisphere” (line 2-3). Roosevelt called upon the memory and the past track record of the Nazi 
aggressor that he demonstrated for the American public in the Arsenal address. The call to action 
is consistent though obviously intensified, “Never before has there been a greater challenge to 
life, liberty, and civilization. Delay invites greater danger” (line 4-5). Once again Roosevelt 
praised the American people by listing their virtues as what was at stake. Delay, like in the 
Arsenal address, is not acceptable. The American people and government had to act immediately 
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in the face of Axis aggression.  
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Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I have conducted a rhetorical analysis of Roosevelt’s war rhetoric from the 
period leading up to the war as well as the official war declarations against Japan, Germany, and 
Italy. The primary contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate the rhetorical priming that 
Roosevelt masterfully used in his sixteenth Fireside Chat, On the Arsenal of Democracy, as a 
way to gain support for the inevitable involvement in the Second World War. The inclusion of an 
analysis of the citizen response and the official war declarations demonstrate that the priming 
was effective. Furthermore that Roosevelt’s rhetorical pursuits made a largely positive impact on 
those listening. The tools of rhetorical priming in Roosevelt’s priming were enemy construction, 
memory, and epideictic rhetoric. 
 On the Arsenal of Democracy is akin to justificatory war rhetoric. The excerpts offered 
throughout this study demonstrate that Roosevelt deliberated an expedient course of action, 
amplifies the virtues of the American people, and assigns the blame of entering the war on a 
powerful foe. The psychological priming was impressive given the challenges of isolation, a still 
recovering economy, and the recent memory of World War I. Roosevelt effectively offered the 
American people a new way of thinking of themselves, industry, their ability to face challenges, 
and the threats looming just on the other side of Atlantic and the Pacific that kept them safe for 
so long. He sternly cast out the isolationism that defined them before and replaced it with 
progressive and noble defensive capabilities that were in the name of global security. The enemy 
was so menacing that the rest of the world was crumbling, projecting America as the last stand 
against tyranny. Roosevelt succeeded in illuminating the threat that only one year later arrived on 
American shores from the East.  
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 This Fireside Chat is particularly long, direct, and personal. Through the medium of the 
radio, Roosevelt delivered On the Arsenal of Democracy to living rooms across the nation and 
abroad. This nontraditional route of speaking directly to the American people contributed to the 
powerful priming of the American people and a pivot point in American identity. Roosevelt 
expresses this new war industry-centric view of American power throughout the latter portion of 
the speech, “American industrial genius, unmatched throughout all the world in the solution of 
production problems, has been called upon to bring its resources and its talents into action” 
(para. 56). The solution was not industry for one’s own national interests, but for the interests of 
preserving democracy across the globe. With an armament supply to the British, Roosevelt 
entered the United States into a European war for a second time. The official war declarations 
were listened to over the radio as well. The voice of Roosevelt would lead the American people 
through another crisis, perhaps the most challenging one they had faced together. 
 Further studies could be done to see how this message was received in the countries 
outside of America and if it was referenced in public ways, especially in embattled nations. It 
would be a worthwhile study to see if either Hitler or Emperor Hirohito addressed this particular 
course of action as a marker of American engagement in the war abroad. Seeking out non-
obvious priming for war speeches from other presidents that took place before wars were 
officially declared to see if the tools are similar would also be a beneficial study to learn more 
about the rhetorical patterns that lead to war.  
 The Second World War and how it is remembered could be explored further with this 
speech now marked as a public acknowledgement of entering the war abroad and the uncanny 
foreshadowing for the events to come only a year following the address. With military 
conscription active since October 1940 and a nation already primed for war, the official 
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declarations before Congress on December 8,1941 against Japan and the next day against 
Germany and Italy were made much easier after Pearl Harbor, but also easier given the Arsenal 
Fireside Chat. Roosevelt’s masterpiece, On the Arsenal of Democracy, had already done the 
work. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Aoki, K. (2006). A Study of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Persuasive Communication within the 
 Fireside Chat: An Analysis of Language and Style. Human  Communication, 9(1), 71-81. 
Bhatia, A. (2007). Religious metaphor in the discourse of illusion: George W. Bush and Osama 
 bin Laden. World Englishes,Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 507–524. 
Bates, B. R. (2004). Audiences, Metaphors, and the Persian Gulf War. Communication Studies, 
 55, 447-463. 
Baum, M. A., & Kernell, S. (2001). Economic class and popular support for Franklin 
 Roosevelt in war and peace. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65(2), 198-229. 
Biesecker, B. A. (2002). Remembering World War II: The Rhetoric and Politics of 
 National Commemoration at the Turn of the 21st Century. Quarterly Journal of 
 Speech, 88(4), 393. 
Bostdorff, D. M.(2011). Epideictic Rhetoric in the Service of War: George W. Bush on  Iraq 
 and the 60th Anniversary of the Victory over Japan. Communication Monographs 78(3), 
 296-323. 
Bostdorff, D. M. (2003).George W. Bush’s Post-September 11Rhetoric of Covenant 
 Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation.Quarterly Journal of Speech 
 89(4), 293-319. 
Bostdorff, D. M. and Goldzwig, S. R. (2005). History, Collective Memory, and the  
Appropriation  of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Reagan’s Rhetorical Legacy. Presidential 
Studies Quarterly, 35 (4). 
 
 
Bromley, R. (2011). Beast, Vermin, Insect - Hate media and the construction of the enemy: The 
 case of Rwanda, 1990 - 1994. At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, 6539-59.  
Browne, S. (1993). Reading Public Memory in Daniel Webster's Plymouth Rock Oration. 
 Western Journal of Communication, 57 (Fall 1993), 464-477. 
Burke, K. (1945). A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Burke, K. (1954). Permanence and Change: An anatomy of purpose. Berkeley: University of 
 California Press. 
Burke, K. (1950). Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Butler, J. (2002). Somalia and the Imperial Savage: Continuities in the rhetoric of war. Western 
 Journal of Communication, 66(1), 1-24. 
Casey, E. (2004). Public Memory in Place and Time. In K. Phillips (Eds.), Framing Public 
 Memory (17-44). Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press. 
Casey, Steven (2001-11-15). Cautious crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American public opinion, 
 and the war against Nazi Germany. Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.  
Cheney, G. (1983). The Rhetoric of Identification and the Study of Organizational 
 Communication. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 69(2), 143. 
Cherwitz, R. A., & Zagacki, K.S. (1986). Consummatory Versus Justificatory Crisis 
 Rhetoric. Western Journal of Speech Communication: WJSC, 50(4), 307-324. 
Cooper, T. (2011). The Uses of Adversaries: Normalising Violence through the Construction of 
 the Other. At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, 653-11. 
Doughton, S. M. (1993). Metaphorical transcendence: Images of the holy war in Franklin 
 Roosevelt’s first inaugural. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 79 (4), 427. 
Engels, J. (2010). Enemyship. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 
 
Flanagan, J. (2004). Woodrow Wilson’s “Rhetorical Restructuring”: The Transformation  of the 
 American Self and the Construction of the German Enemy. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 
 Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 115-148. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. (2012). Letter to King George 
 (November 22, 1940). Retrieved from http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/
 significant.html. 
Hasian Jr., M. (2003). Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Holocaust, and Modernity’s Rescuse 
 Rhetorics. Communication Quarterly, 51(2), 153-173. 
Hauser, G. (1999). Vernacular Voices: The rhetoric of publics and public spheres. Columbia, 
 South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. 
Herring, H. C. (1938). And So To War. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.  
Hinds, L. B. & Windt, T. (1991). The cold war as rhetoric: The beginnings, 1945-1950. The 
 University of Michigan: Praeger.   
Houck, D. W. (2004). FDR’s Commonwealth Address: Redefining Individualism, 
 Adjudicating  Greatness. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 7(3), 259-282. 
Houck, D. W. (1997). Reading the body in the text: FDR’s 1932 speech to the Democratic 
 National Convention. Southern Communication Journal, 63(1), 20. 
Johnson, W. (1944). The Battle Against Isolationism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kennedy, D. M. (1999). Freedom From Fear: The American people in depression and war, 
  1929-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ivie, R. L. (1974). Presidential Motives for War. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60, 337-345. 
Ivie, R. L. (1980). Images of savagery in American justifications for war. Communication 
 Monographs, 47(4), 279-294.  
 
Jasinski, J. (2001). Source book on rhetoric: Key concepts in contemporary rhetorical 
 studies. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Kiewe, A. (2007). FDR’s first Fireside Chat: Public confidence and the Banking Crisis. 
 College Station: Texas A&M University Press.   
MacDonnell, F. (1995). Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American home front.  
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Medhurst, M. J., Ivie, R. L., Wander, P., & Scott, R. L.. (1997). Cold War rhetoric: 
 Strategy, metaphor, and ideology. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 
Miller Center. (2012). First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1933). Retrieved from  
 http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3280. 
Miller Center. (2012). Fireside Chat 16: On the "Arsenal of Democracy" (December 29, 1940).  
 Retrieved from http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3319. 
Miller Center. (2012). Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War (December 8, 
 1941). Retrieved from http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3324. 
Miller Center. (2012). Message to Congress Requesting War Declarations with Germany and 
 Italy (December 11, 1941). Retrieved from http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/ 
 detail/3815. 
Murphy, J. M. (2003). “Our Mission and Our Moment”: George W. Bush and September 11th. 
 Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 6(4), 607-632. 
Murphy, J. M. (forthcoming). No End Save Victory: FDR and the End of Isolationism 1936- 
 1941. In Olson, C., Wilson, K., and Pfau, M., Making the Case: Studies in Public 
 Advocacy in Honor of David Zarefsky (pp. 127-160). Michigan State University Press. 
Noon, D. (2004). Operation Enduring Analogy: World War II, the War on Terror, and the Uses  
 
 of Historical Memory. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 7(3), 339-365. 
Spurr, D. (1993). The rhetoric of empire: Colonial discourse in journalism, travel writing, and 
 imperial administration. Durham & London: Duke University Press. 
Sturken, M. (1997). Tangled Memories: The Vietnam war, the AIDS epidemic, and the politics of 
 remembering. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Vivian, B. (2006). Neoliberal Epideictic: Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics on 
 September 11, 2002. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 92(1), 1-26. 
Vivian, B. (2010). Public forgetting: The rhetoric and politics of beginning again. University 
 Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tiara Foster  
Curriculum vitae  
 
tfoster@syr.edu 
503-877-5504 
 
Education  
Pennsylvania State University PhD. Candidate Communication Arts & Sciences 
 
Syracuse University, M.A. Communication and Rhetorical Studies, May 2013 
Master’s Thesis Title: “Constructing a World War II America: The rhetorical craftsmanship of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt,” Thesis Advisor: Brad Vivian  
 
Willamette University, B.A. Rhetoric and Media Studies, Cum Laude, May 2011 Thesis Title: 
“Palin Reality,” Thesis Advisor: Cindy Koenig Richards Comprehensive Exams taken January 
2011 Overall GPA 3.74, in major GPA 3.93 Advisor: Catherine Collins  
 
Conference Participation  
National Communication Association November 15th-18th, 2012 in Orlando, Florida. Accepted 
to present “Sights on Palin: Revealing an American enemy through enemyship and metaphorical 
analysis” and receive the James L. Golden award for Outstanding Student Essay.  
 
Rhetoric Society of America May 25th-28th, 2012 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
Presented “Palin Reality: A metaphorical and narrative analysis of Palin’s vice presidential 
nomination acceptance speech.”  
 
Symbolic Violence Conference Texas A&M March 1st-4th, 2012 in College Station, Texas 
Presented “Sights on Palin: Revealing an American enemy through enemyship and metaphorical 
analysis.”  
 
Northwest Association Communication Conference April 14th-16th, 2011 in Coeur d’ Alene, 
Idaho. Presented The Voice of Proposition 8 Opponents.  
 
Western States Communication Association Undergraduate Scholars’ Research Conference 
February 18th- 22nd, 2011 in Monterey, California. Presented The Demands of Metaphor: 
Presidential Justificatory War Rhetoric from 1990 and 2001.  
 
Academic Achievement Awards  
James L. Golden Outstanding Student Essay, 2012, merit based 
Mary L. Collins Grad Scholarship, 2011-2014, merit based 
Shannon P. Hogue Scholarship for Excellence in Rhetoric and Media Studies, 2010, merit based 
Transfer Honor Scholar, 2008-2011, merit based 
Willamette Compass Scholarship, 2008-2011, merit based  
 
 
 
 
 
Membership  
National Communication Association, 2012-Present  
Rhetorical Society of America, 2011-Present 
Mortar Board Honor Society, 2010-2011  
 
Teaching Experience  
Teaching Assistant, Syracuse University, August 2011-Present  
Presentational Speaking, Fall 2012 
Public Advocacy, Fall 2011, Spring 2012  
 
Research Experience  
Archival Research, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives, 
Hyde Park, NY. 2011 and 2012. Researched and collected citizen letters and collected Japanese 
American internment maps  
Research Assistant, Assisted Prof. Jeremy Miller with “Exploring the Survival Processing 
Advantage in Recognition Memory” (April 2009). Experiments tested whether objects needed 
for survival were more readily recognized than non-survival related objects or not. 
 
Professional Experience  
Feature Editor, Collegian Newspaper, May 2010 - December 2010 
Office Assistant, Michael Rice C.P.A., March 2008 - February 2010 Customer Service & Geek 
Squad, Best Buy, September 2003 - April 2007  
 
References  
Brad Vivian, Syracuse University Communication and Rhetorical Studies Professor, Advisor 
315-443-5140 bjvivian@syr.edu Sims Hall 106  
 
Kendall Phillips, Professor; Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Studies Communication 
and Rhetorical Studies Syracuse University 315-443-2883 kphillip@syr.edu Sims Hall 100  
 
Catherine Collins, Willamette University Rhetoric and Media Studies Professor, Undergraduate 
Advisor 503-370-6281 ccollins@willamette.edu Ford Hall 312  
 
Mark Stewart, Willamette University Associate Dean, Previous Undergraduate Advisor 503-370-
6661 mstewart@willamette.edu Gatke 101  
 
